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One of the most important factors for creating the sustainable society is that the 
individuals in that society behave in an environmentally sustainable fashion. Yet 
achieving appropriate behavior in any society is difficult, and the challenge is no less 
with regards to sustainability. Three of the most important factors for determining 
behavior have recently been highlighted by psychologists: personal efficacy, social 
influence, and internal standards. Because these three factors play a prominent role in 
behavior, it is necessary to examine what role they play in creating sustainability and 
how they may be utilized to achieve optimal behavior patterns. Ultimately, in order to 
achieve sustainability solutions must focus on individual action, realistic governmental 
regulation, and sustained, direct encounters with the natural world. While much time 
and energy has been spent on social influence and personal efficacy, less has been 
devoted to internal standards and this area needs more attention if there is to be any 
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BEHAVIOR AND SUSTAINABILITY 
 
The State of the World 
 We are living in a time of crisis. Within the last century, the health and 
stability of the natural environment has been steadily deteriorating. Indeed, 
fundamental environmental problems such as pollution, species loss, global 
warming, deforestation, and so on are becoming increasingly worse.1 To look at 
just one facet of our current environmental ills consider loss of biodiversity. 
Species and habitat are being wiped at an incredible rate due to growing 
population and consumption rates, as well as rapid and aggressive economic 
globalization. The tropical rainforests, long a flagship for environmental causes 
and storehouses of the majority of the world’s genetic and species diversity, are 
currently being destroyed at an alarming rate. To quote some representative 
numbers, Madagascar has lost sixty-six percent of its tropical forests, sixty-eight 
percent of the Congo’s rain forest is slated for clearing while every year fourteen-
thousand-square kilometers of rain forest in the Amazon Basin is destroyed.2 Of 
course, it is not only forests that are being squeezed, a number of important 
species have seen their numbers drop dramatically in the last thirty years. One 
report claims that up to a quarter of the world's monkeys will not survive another 
                                                           
1
 It is sometimes argued that environmental conditions are getting better rather than worse, 
though this view is in the definite minority; see especially Bjørn Lomborg, The Skeptical 
Environmentalist: Measuring the State of the Real World (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001) and Mark Sagoff, “Do We Consume Too Much?” In Atlantic Monthly 279, no.6 (June 
1997): pp. 80-96. For a thorough and up to date source for current environmental problems and 
solution is the “State of the World” series put out annually by the World Watch Institute. 
2
 G. Tyler Miller, Jr., Living in the Environment, 11
th
 ed. (Pacific Grove, California: Brooks/Cole, 
2000), pp. 14–15. 
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two decades; another warned that the tiger may be extent within the next twenty 
years while another laments the decline of the sharks, noting that the 
hammerhead and the great white sharks have been reduced by upwards of 
seventy percent in the last fifteen years, while others, like the silky white tip, have 
disappeared from some areas altogether. 3 In fact, one report even goes so are at 
to ague that humans may actually be preventing new species from forming!4 And 
if charismatic animals are in these dire straights, one can expect that animals 
less popular such as insects and other unattractive specimens are may be 
having far more urgent problems.   
But it is not just charismatic species and aesthetic marvels that are being 
seriously jeopardized. Elements of the natural world which humans rely on on a 
daily basis are also being seriously affected by environmental problems. 
Cropland, for example, has been seriously degraded. Forty percent of North 
America’s range and cropland has lost productivity, seventy-two percent of range 
and cropland in central Asia from the Middle East to China has been lost and six 
hundred and forty thousand square kilometers of land south of the Sahara have 
turned to desert since 1940.5 Likewise, fresh water, one of our most important 
                                                           
3
 For reference to the studies on primates see Gibby Zobel “Brazil Monkeys Stare Extinction in 
the Face,” Aljazeera.Net, 4 May 2005, published at http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/CA 
B6B9A0-21E5-4C55-9D38-ED2F6AEE8B46.htm. For reference to the study concerning Tigers 
see Jagpreet Luthra “India hard pressed to save the tiger,” Aljazeera.Net, 14 August 2006, 
published at http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/ 3577D99B-5186-4467-95F3-75F39A269 
B11.htm; and for reference to the report on sharks see Juan Forero, “Hidden Cost of Shark Fin 
Soup: Its Source May Vanish,” New York Times, 5 January 2006, National Edition, Foreign Desk, 
p. 4.  
4
 Carl Zimmer, “Humans May Have Limiting Effect on the Origin of (New) Species,” New York 
Times, 23 May 2006, National Edition, Science Desk, p. 2.    
 
5
 Miller, Living in the Environment, pp. 14–5. 
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resources, is appearing to run dry. Nearly seventy percent of all freshwater 
currently goes into agriculture; yet, according to the United Nation’s Food and 
Agricultural Organization, agricultural production will need to increase by fifty 
percent in order to keep pace with demand created by population increase. In 
other words, a need for a fifty percent increase in water supply, but this will be 
extremely difficult. Fresh water is currently used for many things besides 
agriculture; it is also used for cooking, cleaning, sewage, lawns, industry, 
technology, and a host of other goods and services. It is estimated that industry 
in the United States alone will soon be using over three hundred and ninety-six 
billion gallons of water while producing over seventy-nine billion gallons of 
wastewater.6 Consequently, growing affluence, technology, and ever-increasing 
demand for fresh water has caused global water consumption to double every 
twenty years. Coupled with this growing consumption is the disturbing trend of 
water pollution, which has increased along with technology, pesticide use, and 
chemical contamination. 
Needless to say, things cannot continue. If we wish to have a beautiful, 
bountiful and ultimately livable world, there will have to be a fundamental shift in 
human practices to create what has been termed a sustainable society — a 
society that “manages its economy and population size without exceeding all or 
part of the planet’s ability to absorb environmental insults, replenish its 
                                                           
6
 Maude Barlow and Tony Clarke, Blue Gold: The Fight to Stop the Corporate Theft of the World’s 
Water (New York: The New Press, 2002), pp. 6-9.  
 
 4 
resources, and sustain human and other forms of life over … thousands of 
years.”7  
The path to achieving a sustainable society is a long one and it will require 
a number of social and cultural changes in order to be successfully achieved. 
One of the most important areas of change will involve lifestyle; how one acts on 
a day-to-day basis. Those living in industrialized countries are continually making 
decisions affecting environmental well-being. Paper or plastic (or canvas as the 
case may be), recycling or dumping, organic or conventional; these are daily 
questions involving lifestyle choices that have a corresponding action. 
Consequently, how individuals act is of the utmost importance in creating a 
sustainable society.  
While there have been scores of authors contributing to the process of 
creating an environmental ethic (and criticizing those theories that have been 
proposed), much less attention has been focused on the implementation of an 
environmental ethic, whatever shape it might ultimately take. This point is not 
trivial: it matters little how theoretically rigorous an environmental ethic is, how 
internally cogent, or how impervious to academic criticizing; if it is unable to 
muster sustainable changes in lifestyle and society, it is surely deficient as an 
environmental ethic. Because of the inextricable link between environmental 
theory and action, in this thesis I seek to lay out the most important factors 
influencing behavior and relate them to the practice of an environmental ethic.  
 
 
                                                           
7
 Miller, Living in the Environment, p. 5.  
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Factors Influencing Behavior 
Three of the most important factors involved with individual behavior are 
the feeling of personal influence on a given scenario, environmental/social 
influences, and one’s own moral standards. If individuals are expected to make 
significant changes in lifestyle in order to achieve some environmental goal (e.g., 
riding the bus instead of driving a car in order to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions), they must have confidence their actions will effect some change 
towards the desired goal. As noted in research on self-efficacy,  
 
Unless people believe that they can bring about desired outcomes and 
forestall undesired ones by their actions, they have little incentive to act or 
to persevere in the face of difficulties and adversities. Whatever other 
factors may operate as guides and motivators, they are rooted in the core 




One of the factors that reduces an individual’s sense of personal influence 
over environmental problems is the scale of the environmental problems 
currently being faced. Because many environmental problems are now examined 
at the global level, solutions are often framed in terms of large national and 
international entities such as governments and corporations. As a result, there is 
a perpetuation of the belief that only groups are important to environmental 
issues and that individual actors can contribute little or nothing. While it is 
undoubtedly the case that group actions can be a powerful force in creating 
                                                           
8 Albert Bandura et al. "Sociocognitive Self-Regulatory Mechanisms Governing Transgressive 





change, this certainty does not obviate the importance of individual actors as 
cultural influencers and motivators, and as de facto contributors to problems are 
solutions. When individual actors realize the importance of their actions for a 
given end, they will be more likely to engage in those actions. So the first factor 
important to developing environmentally friendly behavior patterns is the 
enhancement of belief in one’s influence over environmental problems and 
solutions.  
The second factor that plays a pivotal role in determining behavior is 
environmental/social influences. Often, solutions to environmental problems are 
framed in terms of social influences, especially in the form of governmental 
regulation. If environmental problems are ultimately caused by shortsightedness, 
greed, and otherwise poor decision-making processes on the part of the 
individual, then an obvious solution would be for society as a whole to seek 
government-based regulation that strongly dictates personal decision making. 
Unfortunately, this solution, developed by Hobbes in the 17th century and later 
applied to environmental problems in the 20th century, falls short of solving 
environmental problems. One of the main limitations of governmental coercion is 
that it is based on erroneous assumptions concerning human nature. Indeed, not 
all environmental choices are made due to humans naturally being greedy or 
short-sighted, and in cases where individuals are able to make optimal 
environmental choices, governmental regulation can be a hindrance rather than a 
help. Another limitation of governmental regulation is that it works best when it is 
in accordance with the beliefs of those being regulated. The majority of citizens 
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must already agree with the regulations in question; there are not enough 
enforcement officers to compel all the people all the time. Thus, although 
governmental is important in regulating in behavior, it does have significant 
limitations.  
The third factor that influences behavior involves personal standards. 
Although much work has been done in developing moral values (e.g., creating 
consistent, workable, and applicable environmental ethic), there has been less 
attention focused on the transition from moral attitudes to moral conduct. While 
moral education is important in developing a system of values that facilitates 
sustainable decision making, it is not enough to ensure that individuals will act in 
a sustainable manner. Even with a strong sense of personal values, people may 
still act in hypocritical ways, transgressing their own personal moral standards. 
One of the reasons for this behavior is that social structures enable individuals to 
eschew the feeling of responsibility for their actions. By creating scenarios where 
the consequences of our actions can be minimized, displaced, or otherwise 
ignored, our social and cultural contexts allow responsible persons to act in 
irresponsible ways. Thus, a third factor to be addressed in regards to behavior is 
in the transition from moral thought to moral action.  
While it has been recognized that behavior is an important factor in 
achieving sustainability, the majority of energy is focused on social/environmental 
influence, specifically governmental regulation. In order to achieve optimal 
behavior, all three factors affecting behavior, self-efficacy, social/environmental 
influences, and internal moral standards, must be looked at and addressed. 
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Attention must be shifted towards personal efficacy and especially the transition 
of moral attitude to conduct before there can be any realistic shift in changes of 




























The first factor that strongly affects behavior is the feeling of personal 
influence. The sustainable society depends on individuals making the appropriate 
decisions in their public as well as private life. Yet, many individuals do not feel 
that their actions make a significant difference. One of the problems that can 
result from this feeling of inefficacy is that individuals may begin relying on 
outside forces to help them behave in ways consistent with their values; they feel 
little responsibility for environmental problems when it appears that their 
contribution is very minor. Consider for example the following section taken from 
Mark Sagoff’s The Economy of the Earth:  
 
Like [my students] and like members of the public generally, I, too, 
have divided preferences or conflicting “preference maps.” Last year, I 
bribed a judge to fix a couple of traffic tickets, and I was glad to do so 
because I saved my license. Yet, at election time, I helped to vote the 
corrupt judge out of office. I speed on the highway; yet I want the police to 
enforce laws against speeding. I used to buy mixers in returnable bottles – 
but who can bother to return them? I buy only disposable now, but to 
soothe my conscience, I urge my state senator to outlaw one-way 
containers.  
I love my car; I hate the bus. Yet I vote for candidates who promise 
to tax gasoline to pay for public transportation. . . . The political causes I 
support seem to have little or no basis in my interests as a consumer, 
because I take different points of view when I vote and when I shop. I 
have an “Ecology Now” sticker on a car that drips oil everywhere it is 
parked.9  
 
                                                           
9
 Mark Sagoff, The Economy of the Earth: Philosophy, Law, and the Environment (Cambridge 
and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988). pp. 52–53. 
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In this passage, Sagoff is showing that we behave differently qua 
consumers than we do qua citizens. Yet, he is also revealing the way in which 
individuals have come to rely on governmental coercion to enforce their personal 
behavior. The problem with relying on the government as a motivator for one’s 
personal values is that it is often too little and too late. Being composed of 
multiple ideologies, the government is usually able to only pass regulations that 
has been watered-down due to compromise and that comes significantly later 
than needed. The Endangered Species Act was passed in 1973, after the Bald 
Eagle, grizzly bear, peregrine falcon, whooping crane, and other species were 
perilously close to facing extinction. If everyone had waited until the government 
had stepped in to regulate endangered species, it is unlikely any of those species 
would still exist today. 
Of course, it is not just that regulation is too little, too late; sometimes it 
doesn’t come at all. Sagoff wishes his senator would outlaw one-way containers 
so that he will be more motivated to use returnable bottles, but the likelihood of 
disposables being outlawed any time soon is not great. So when the individual 
feels that their individual actions do not amount to anything, they can actually 
work against the very goals they desire. Sagoff presumably wants to get rid of 
one-way containers because he would like to curb landfills, pollution, and energy 
consumption; and yet by his own actions he further exacerbates the problems he 
would like to see solved.  
In order to achieve a sustainable society then, it is necessary for the 
individual to realize the importance of their actions so that environmental 
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problems can be addressed rapidly and fully. Yet, many environmentalists feel 
completely overwhelmed when discussing environmental problems. This is not 
an unreasonable concern; in a world comprised of more than six-billion people, 
one starts to wonder just how much effect a single person can have. The doubt 
of one’s influence can be seen in terms of two questions. First, do individual 
actions make any difference at all? Assuming that individual actions do make 
some difference, the second question comes in terms of impact. Does an 
individual’s impact make enough of a difference to matter in the face of actions 
taken by enormous and influential actors like governments and corporations?  
 
Refuting the Argument that Individual Actions are Futile  
To look at these questions in better detail, we can refer to the work of J. 
Baird Callicott who argues that individual responsibility is futile in environmental 
ethics. Early in his career, Callicott attempted to set a practical example of 
environmental ethics by living a sustainable lifestyle: riding his bike instead of 
driving, growing his own food, and collecting his own fuel wood (among other 
things). Yet, in the end he felt these actions were an impractical route to securing 
sustainability. As he writes, 
 
Meanwhile, the U.S. economy kept growing and most everyone else went 
on consuming fossil fuels — limited, if at all, only by the formation of 
OPEC, not conscience. Industrial agriculture expanded. Shopping malls 
sprang up in erstwhile hayfields and wetlands just as they did all over 
North America from coast to coast and from Canada to Mexico. And 
adding insult to injury, while I was trying to live, to practice an 
environmental ethic at a considerable cost of time and effort, to say 
nothing of money, my colleagues in the field at other universities were 
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publishing papers, attending conferences, and getting ahead 
professionally. When the man who believed trees caused pollution was 
elected president of the United States in 1980, I decided that it was high 
time to reassess my strategy for infusing an environmental ethic at the 
practical level.10 
 
Callicott here persuasively describes the problem many environmentalists 
face. To live a green lifestyle (assuming it is possible) is costly, takes 
considerable time and energy, is severely limiting, and is often incompatible with 
many desired professions (try being an academic now a days while living off the 
grid). Furthermore, with increased globalization, access to resources and the 
democratization of a consumer-driven lifestyle, our individual efforts can seem 
like just a drop in the ocean of ecological problems. As Callicott puts it, “the 
incremental approach — you change, I change, the next person changes, and 
after a while we all will have changed our behavior — seems futile.”11 Indeed, 
Callicott argues that there is a substantive difference between the ethical domain 
that encompasses environmental ethics and the domain that houses other sorts 
of ethics such as animal rights or anti-abortionism. The former is holistic while the 
latter is individualistic. 
 
Each ethically motivated decision to eschew abortion and carry to term an 
unplanned and unwelcome pregnancy saves the life of the precious 
human fetus. Each ethically motivated decision to eschew the purchase of 
a fur coat saves the skins of a score or more individually precious minks. 
Each person who refuses to engage in lethal combat may save the life of 
another precious person. . . .  If a single human life is saved, or a single 
fetus is allowed to be born, or a single animal is spared suffering and 
                                                           
10
 J. Baird Callicott, Beyond the Land Ethic (New York: SUNY Press, 1999), pp. 45-58. This 
article originally appeared in Ethics and the Environment 9 (1996): 3-14. 
11
 Ibid., p. 49 
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premature death, then one’s self-imposed, morally motivated limitation on 
freedom of action will not have been in vain. But environmental ethics 
concerns populations of animals and plants, species, ecosystems, and the 
biosphere as a whole. No purely personal practice of environmental ethics 
that I undertook or any that I could have undertaken would have prevented 
global warming or soil erosion or species extinction. For any significant 
environmental benefits to occur our whole society and culture will have to 
undertake fundamental structural changes.12 
 
 
 Callicott is arguing that due to the very nature of environmental problems, 
the effects of individual actions are so severely diminished as to be utterly futile. 
One may choose to sell his or her car and walk for the rest of their days, but if no 
one else does likewise, it certainly won’t stop global warming. This kind of 
example makes it clear why environmentalists might focus largely on group 
change, whereas proponents of other ethical domains (as Callicott phrases it) 
would focus on individual responsibility; individual actions are ineffectual for 
achieving environmental sustainability.13 Callicott claims that, unlike the animal 
rights activist who makes a difference  every time he or she chooses hummus 
over liver pâté (by saving an animal life), an environmentalist only makes a real 
difference when he or she votes, lobbies, or does something else to change the 
political compass of the great ship of state and its constituents.14 The implication 
is that individual actions are essentially useless in terms of environmental 
solutions because they are individually negligible.  
                                                           
12
 Ibid., pp. 47-48. 
13
 And Callicott is not alone here. In 2004, the Sierra Club spent 63 percent (about 28.8 million 
dollars) of its programs budget on “Studying and influencing public policy” while only 17 percent 
(7.9 million) went to “information and education.” Statistics compiled by the Better Business 
Bureau; available at http://charityreports.give.org/Public/Report.aspx?CharityID=1330. 
14
 Callicott sees “the political implementation of environmental ethics” as the “the only 
implementation that can make a significant practical difference.” Beyond the Land Ethic, p. 51 
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If taken literally, Callicott is claiming that nothing we do as individuals 
either helps or hinders environmental problems. Those who agree with this view 
may be labeled collective-action environmentalists because they see group 
actions as the only way to bring about change; individual actions are considered 
quite futile because they are merely a drop in the bucket. Yet, prima facie this 
view seems very mistaken. Collective-action environmentalists may not grow all 
their own food but surely they recycle. If organically grown produce were the 
same price as conventional, surely they would purchase pesticide-free crops 
over the alternative, and not simply for health reasons. In fact, collective-action 
environmentalists may even go so far as to avoid the ever-trendy SUV as a form 
of transportation because of both high gas prices and global warming. But why 
do any of things if our actions truly make no difference?  
First and foremost, they do so because our individual actions do have very 
real effects on ourselves and the rest of the world. While group impact may be 
altogether larger, this does not mean that individual impact is negligible. Even the 
act of switching on a light bulb has a number of very real, concrete effects. There 
is a direct connection between the energy that lights my house and the burning of 
coal to produce the electricity that the light requires. Furthermore, there is a 
direct physical connection between the energy that lights my house and the 
entire infrastructure through which electricity is conceived. Consequently, when 
electricity is not used at my house, this stoppage also has a very real, concrete 
effect on the world, even if it is a minor one, all things considered. Every pound of 
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carbon not used in one’s daily routine is just that, a pound of carbon not emitted 
into the atmosphere.  
Because individual actions, especially environmentally sensitive ones are 
often seen as isolated, ahistorical incidents, distinct from one another and the 
world at large, it is easy to view our actions as minimal at most. But seeing 
individual actions within a temporal context, the depth and profundity of one’s 
lifestyle becomes clearer. For example, in the PBS spoof documentary Affluenza, 
one of the characters decides to take inventory of the amount of waste his family 
produces in a year and the results are disconcerting. By the end of the year his 
five-person family has managed to fill an entire dumpster with waste. Anecdotal 
stories aside, statistical research also illuminate how much impact an individual 
can have. According to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) the average 
household in Falls Church, Virginia (with average household being about two 
people) puts out around twelve and a half pounds of waste per day. In Chatham, 
New York, it is almost sixteen pounds per household per day — about two and a 
half people per household leave six and a half pounds per person.15 Surely six 
plus pounds of waste per day must qualify as significant.  
Moreover it is not just in terms of garbage that individual actions can 
produce surprisingly strong results. As another example, homes that install a 
solar thermal system to heat their water reduce carbon dioxide emissions by 
                                                           
15
 Environmental Protection Agency, “Cutting the Waste Stream in Half: Community Record-
Setters Show How” (1999). http://www.epa.gov/epaoswer/non-hw/reduce/r99013.pdf. 
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about 720 pounds annually.16 Although there is no clear line demarcating 
negligible environmental impacts from actual environmental impacts, one would 
be hard-pressed to argue that a dumpster of stuff a year, stuff made up of 
individual items, each bringing with them their own history of resource and 
energy use, can be dismissed as a “drop in the bucket.” Indeed, this point was 
not lost on Aldo Leopold, the grandfather of environmental ethics:  
 
There is lacking only a simple formula by which we, and posterity, may act 
to make America a permanent institution instead of a trial balloon. The 
formula is: learn how to tell good land-use from bad. Use your land 
accordingly, and refuse aid and comfort to those who do not. 
 
Isn’t this more to the point than merely voting, petitioning, and writing 
checks for bigger and better bureaus, in order that our responsibilities may 
be laid in bigger and better laps.  
 
. . . 
 
Nearly all American wheat is the product of exploitation. Behind your 
breakfast toast is the burning strawstacks, feeding the air with nitrogen 
belonging in the soil. Behind your birthday cake is the eroding Palouse, 
the over-wheated praires, feeding the rivers with silt for army engineers to 
push around with dredge and shovel, at your expense; for irrigation 
engineers to fill their dams with, at the expense of the future. Behind each 
loaf of (inedible) baker’s bread is the “ever normal” granary, the roar of the 
combine, the swish of the gang plow, ravaging the land they were built to 
feed, because it is cheaper to raise wheat by exploitation than by honest 
farming. It wouldn’t be cheaper if exploitation wheat lacked market. You 
are the market, but transportation has robbed you of all power to 
discriminate. If you want conservation wheat, you will have to raise it 
yourself.17     
 
                                                           
16




 Aldo Leopold, The River of the Mother of God: And Other Essays by Aldo Leopold, eds. Susan 
L. Flader and J. Baird Callicott (Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1992). pp. 296-97 
 
 17 
 As Leopold points out, what has been mentioned thus far is only half the 
story. Besides the direct physical impact that comes from individual actions 
(pounds of waste), one must also take into account direct effects in terms of 
economic and cultural orientation — after all, “you are the market.” While the 
extent to which consumer preferences dictate the market (as opposed to the 
market dictating consumer preferences) is debatable, it is clear that there is 
influence. One of the more prominent examples has been the increasing trend 
towards organic foods. Virtually absent from all major grocery stores five years 
ago, organic produce is now being sold at Wal-Mart, the world’s largest retail 
store.18 There has been a shift to local foods as well, as consumers’ preferences 
have shifted to edibles that don’t travel half way across the world to reach their 
plate. An article in the New York Times highlights the influence conscionable 
consumers have, noting that they “will influence mainstream shoppers, since the 
typical consumer has neither the time nor the inclination to untangle the politics 
of a supply chain when they are buying milk or a loaf of bread.”19 On a global 
level, preferences in consumer tastes dictate a type of environmental ethic. A 
recent report on China’s economic development found many small, independent 
companies in that country adopting high environmental standards to fill the 
demands of niche markets across the U.S. and Europe.20 Many successful have 
                                                           
18
 Michael Pollan, “Mass Natural,” New York Times Magazine, 4 June 2006, p. 15.  
19
 Kim Severson, “Why Roots Matter More,” New York Times, 15 November 2006, National 
Edition, Small Business, p. 1. For the shift in local foods, see “Organic Apple? Check. But Is It 
Local?” Narr. Kathy Witkowsky. All Things Considered. National Public Radio, KERA, 4 August, 
2006.  
20
 “China’s Environment: Paying for Prosperity — Part Three: Exporting Goods, Importing 
Standards” Narr. Mary Kay Magistad,  The World. Public Radio International, 19 July, 2006. 
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tailored products in terms of individual preferences and not necessarily group 
preferences.      
 
Absolute versus Discrimination Thresholds 
So the answer as to whether individual actions have impact is a 
straightforward one. Not only do individual actions have an impact but, 
depending on what problem one is attempting to solve, they can have a 
significant impact. Possibly the reason Callicott and others see individual actions 
as futile is because they are viewing them in terms of absolutes rather than 
degrees. Jonathon Glover’s article on collective and individual responsibility is 
helpful in better understanding this distinction. Glover refers to an absolute 
threshold where there is a sharp boundary between two different outcomes. If 
one’s act does not result in this threshold being crossed, that act has contributed 
nothing to the outcome: the event is all-or-nothing. The other type is a 
discrimination threshold, those situations where an individual’s action will push a 
situation farther in a particular direction; this effort, though real, will be unnoticed 
because its effects will be distributed throughout society.21  
Environmental problems may be best understood in terms of 
discrimination thresholds, because they are rarely all-or-nothing affairs. Pollution, 
for example, works in degrees as does habitat and species loss, genetic 
homogenization, and general ecosystem disruption. Yet simply showing that 
environmental problems generally fall under discrimination-type thresholds may 
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not be enough to convince someone that individual actions make a difference. 
They may feel that even if an action does have some affect, it will not be a 
significant one. As Barton H. Thompson argues, most people feel that their 
“individual decisions will have only a marginal impact on the health of the 
resource; unlike unilateral voluntary actions, the adoption of a universal solution 
can save the resource.”22 Glover argues something similar, that actions that fall 
within the discrimination threshold only make a difference when they are 
combined. If it is highly unlikely that individual actions will combine to create a 
significant difference, then, Glover argues, it makes no difference whether 
someone performs the action or not.  
One of the problems with this sort of argument is that it is contingent on 
what constitutes a significant difference and that in turn is dependent on 
contextual elements like ecological factors, individual values, side effects and so 
on. The more difficult it is too see what is significant, the more difficult it is to 
argue that one’s individual actions don’t make a difference. For example, 
suppose I apply heavy doses of chemical fertilizers and herbicides to my lawn so 
that it runs off into the pond behind my house. Suppose further that though there 
are not enough poisons and fertilizer to completely deaden the ecosystem of the 
pond, there is enough to create a relatively small area of disturbance (hypoxia, 
for example) near my lawn. Does this disturbance constitute a significant 
change? How large of an area needs to be affected in order to constitute 
significant change? Would it be significant if the pond were only two hundred feet 
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in circumference? What if it was the ocean? The answer to this question lies 
partly in ecological knowledge, such as how much the ecosystem can absorb 
before it becomes unstable, what sort of flora and fauna currently exist in the 
pond, how these flora and fauna will be affected by run-off, to what extent will the 
hypoxia in my pond affect other ecosystems, etc. The other part of what will 
constitute a significant change depends on world view; ecological factors must be 
couched in some sort of value framework before they can have any meaning. If 
the last remaining individuals of an endangered species exist solely within my 
pond, then the significance of my actions may change dramatically. Thus, in the 
end, does the individual’s action of dosing their lawn make a difference?  
Of course, the difficulty of determining what is significant is further 
exacerbated when considering possible side effects. For example, when 
considering the environmental impact of coal, gasoline, and other fossil fuels, 
discussion tends to  center on global warming; yet, there are a thousand other 
consequences from cutting emissions: cleaner air, cleaner waters, fossil fuel 
independence, and so on. Furthermore, greenhouse gases have a history long 
before they reach the atmosphere: they are extracted using mountaintop 
removal, off-shore drilling, wildlife disruption, toxic processing, and so on. They 
require geopolitical strategies that wreck struggling nations, prop up dictators and 
wage war. Questions of the significance of an action are further obscured when 
considering all the possible consequences of an action — individual use may not 
stop global warming, but it may help to clean local air.  
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A final difficulty in determining significance is the problem of being able to 
predict the likeliness that one’s actions will or will not combine with others to 
create an outcome. Predictions of this kind become especially difficult when 
considering multiple variables such as time, or the likelihood of others’ 
participation, or the influence on others’ decision making. Consider an ethical 
domain which would have an easily identifiable level of significance of: animal 
rights. Because animals are individuals (and, if one is an animal right’s activist, 
each animal’s life is significant), our individual actions will make a difference 
concerning their welfare. As Callicott points out, each ethically motivated decision 
to avoid purchasing a fur coat saves the lives of a dozen or more individually 
precious minks. But the purchasing of fur coats is a rarity in our day-to-day 
dealings with animals; in most cases, the slaughter of an animal requires more 
than one consumer. Each ethically motivated decision to eschew, say, a 
hamburger, does not in fact save an individual. It takes a lot of people to eat a 
cow; indeed, it takes an entire group. The same is true in the case of many other 
problems that animal rights activists address. The shunning of such commodities 
as leather and gelatin (the latter is made from ground up animal bones), or the 
avoidance of milk and eggs (which strict vegetarians do) does not save an  
individual. Maybe the reason it is still rational for a vegetarian to avoid 
hamburgers (even though an individual is not saved in the act) is because the 
discrimination threshold is lower, i.e., it takes only ten people to quit eating steak 
to save a cow’s life. But this possibility points to the enormous complications in 
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this sort of reasoning. If environmental problems are best understood in terms of 
discrimination thresholds, it is difficult to shrug off the import of individual actions.  
Another way of exploring the importance of individual action is supplied by 
political theorist Anthony Downs who argues that voters have little incentive to 
vote because they cannot expect to have any impact on the outcome of a given 
political election.23 Russell Hardin elaborates on this point: 
 
In the New Hampshire election for the United States Senate in 1974, Louis 
Wyman and John Durkin were virtually tied at about 111,000 votes each . . 
. . Eventually the US Senate declared the election undecidedable and 
declined to seat either candidate. The vote was then retaken in a special 
election . . . . This odd election shows that merely for practical reasons of 
the impossibility of counting votes accurately, one more vote is unlikely to 
make a difference in an election even in as small a polity — less than a 
quarter of a million voters — as New Hampshire, one of the smallest 
states in the United States. The individual voter essentially does not count. 
An editorial response to the presidential vote-counting in Florida in 2000 
was to lecture citizens with the claim that one’s vote does count after all. 
The more plausible inference from that debacle is that one’s vote clearly 
could not have counted because it was swamped by the margin of error.24 
 
 
Indeed, it can be extremely difficult to argue that voting is of any 
importance at all, though it is often believed to be one of the single most 
important things one does (politically speaking). Often collective-action oriented 
environmentalists who feel that individual actions do not matter are steadfast in 
their belief that voting does matter. This is not to say that voting is or is not 
important; it is only to show the further difficulty in assessing the significance of 
an action.  
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In the end, then, one can only say that individual actions working towards 
a discrimination threshold are unimportant only when they know fully the 
contextual and temporal consequences of their actions, including side effects, 
and further, that the actions would not be combined to create a significant 
change. Although philosophers do their best to put ethical judgments into nicely 
packaged, disparate boxes, real-world scenarios rarely fit into categories 
accessible to this sort of calculus. Even when it is actually the case that individual 
actions will not combine to create a significant outcome, determining these sorts 
of scenarios is extremely difficult. Instead of wondering what the chances of 
causing (or preventing) harm are possible under a given scenario x, it may be 
easier in most cases simply to assume that individual actions do have an effect 
and that these effects should be considered significant.  
Even in cases where one knows with certainty that their individual actions 
will not make a significant difference, it may still be important whether or not they 
are performed. Thus far, significance has been understood solely in terms of the 
consequences of an action but it can be understood in a broader context. There 
is a karmic aspect of individual actions which should be considered when making 
judgments of actions, whatever their extrinsic outcome. That actions play a role 
in shaping one’s character and consequently one’s moral judgment is not an 
uncommon theme in western philosophy. Both Kant and Aquinas argue that 
one’s treatment towards animals affects one’s character and is reflected in how 
one treats people. Thus, although kicking a dog may be an inconsequential act, it 
enhances a disposition to act cruelly towards others. Even if one’s actions won’t 
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create external consequences, they may have a strong internal effect leading to 
eventual hardening of character, erosion of empathy, and ultimately a shift in 
moral judgment. It is well known that individuals can be conditioned to accept 
abnormally high levels of brutality due to routine exposure of violence and killing. 
Indeed, eighteenth-century England forbade butchers or doctors from sitting on 
juries because they were too accustomed to the sight of death.25 More recent 
examples come readily from war and can be seen in such atrocities as the Mai 
Lai Massacre. One may argue that there is a world of difference between the 
suburbanite fertilizing his lawn and the massacre of innocent civilians. But the 
general point is the same; our actions shape our attitudes in important ways. 
Even if turning off the water while brushing one’s teeth will not stop the 
impending global water crisis, it does foster an ethic and an attitude for positively 
engaging in those occasions that do make a difference. Thus, even if it can be 
shown that individual actions will not be combined with other actions to create 
significant change, it does not follow that they should be taken as insignificant 
and consequently ignored.     
  
Conclusion 
 One of the factors that strongly influences personal behavior is the belief 
that one has control over the outcome of a situation. Without such a belief, 
individuals are less likely to engage in pro-active behavior and are inhibited from 
developing a sense of responsibility associated with their actions. Consequently, 
they are more likely to rely on others to coerce them into behaving in ways 
                                                           
25
 This point is reported by Kant in his Lectures on Ethics.  
 
 25 
consistent with their values and may even act in ways counter productive to their 
own goals. In the environmental arena, it is often argued that individuals have 
little or no impact on environmental problems. But this assumption is clearly 
mistaken; that individual actions have an impact is clear because it can be 
measured in gallons, pounds, and tons. This point can become especially clear 
when individual actions are put in a temporal context, where accumulation of 
effects is more obviously significant. Even when one’s individual actions taken 
alone are not enough to create significant change (however defined), they may 
be combined with the actions of others to create a critical mass. However, 
occasions arise where individual actions need to be combined with others’ in 
order to be significant and it is obvious that the others will not be participating. 
Although individual actions will not lead to significant events, it still does not 
follow that they are eo ipso insignificant. While in this section I have attempted to 
show that the individual does influence the outcomes of important environmental 
problems, it should also be noted that an individual’s habits shape further 
patterns of behavior. Thus, there can be significance in acting, even if one is 
unable to affect the outcome of an event. This awareness and reaffirmation of 
individual power and influence over environmental problems is one of the first 
steps in creating behavior patterns consistent with a sustainable society. An 
environmental ethic, if it is to contribute to sustainable living, must emphasize 





CHAPTER 2  
ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL INFLUENCES 
 
The second factor that strongly influences behavior involves 
environmental and social influences. While environmental and social influences 
come from a variety of sources, one of the most powerful sources of 
environmental influence comes from governmental coercion. If environmental 
problems can be traced to poor choice making on the part of the individual, then 
a reasonable solution is for the development of social regulation that strongly 
dictates personal decision-making. Indeed, governmental regulation as a solution 
to environmental problems has been suggested in the writings of a large number 
of seminal environmental philosophers: Mark Sagoff, Bryan Norton, J. Baird 
Callicott, Aldo Leopold, and Holmes Rolston, III, to name a few26 The call for this 
sort of solution does not fall on the humanities alone, it is echoed as strongly by 
many of the most important ecological and biological scientists working on behalf 
of a sustainable future.27  
To see why this solution is so appealing, it is helpful to look back at the 
arguments of one of its earliest proponents, Thomas Hobbes, and his 
                                                           
26
 For example, see Sagoff, The Economy of the Earth; Bryan G. Norton, Toward a Unity among 
Environmentalists (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); J. Baird Callicott, Beyond the Land 
Ethic; Aldo Leopold, A Sand County Almanac (New York: Ballantine Books, 1949); Holmes 
Rolston, III, Environmental Ethics: Duties to and Values in The Natural World (Philadelphia: 
Temple University, 1988). The same can also be said for more contemporary philosophers like 
Erik Katz and Andrew Light, eds. Environmental Pragmatism (New York: Routledge, 1996), and 
Robert Frodeman, “The Policy Turn in Environmental Ethics,” Environmental Ethics 28 (2006): 3-
20.  
27
 See for example Jane Lubchenco, “Entering the Century of the Environment: A New Social 
Contract for Science,” Science 279 (1998): 491-97, and Margaret A. Palmer et al., “Ecological 
Science and Sustainability for the 21
st
 Century,” Frontiers in Ecology and the Environment 3 no. 1 
(2005): 4-11.  
 
 27 
assumption that human nature requires outside coercion in order to properly 
flourish. Alhough Hobbes’ argument was formulated centuries before dominant 
Western thought considered environmental concern a priority, the structure of his 
thought was reanimated with an environmental twist in the late 1960s by Garret 
Hardin’s analysis of environmental problems.28 Because the argument relies on 
assumptions that still hold sway today, e.g., the inherently flawed character of all 
humans, it still resonates with a number if people. Yet, it has a number of 
problems, both theoretically and empirically, and a thorough examination reveals 
that government regulation at times hinders the very problems government sets 
out to solve.   
 
Hobbes and Leviathan 
The best way to understand Hobbes is through his modernist emphasis on 
human nature. Hobbes concluded that the conditions of human nature are such 
that they operate to everyone’s best advantage when our natural inclinations are 
stymied under the hand of an external enforcer. In his influential work, Leviathan, 
Hobbes argues that humankind’s natural proclivity for competition, diffidence, 
and glory, as well as the scarcity of resources, leads us inevitably towards a state 
of war. To show why, Hobbes invites us to consider a world where there are no 
recognized sources of legal authority. What would this world be like? Because 
Hobbes assumes that humans are inherently competitive, diffident, and glory-
seeking, this world would be one of continual warfare, waged in order to protect 
our holdings or take from others what we need. Even if only a minority were to 
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act in this fashion, everyone would be forced to take defensive measures due to 
fear of attack and might even feel impelled to use preemptive attacks against 
potentially aggressive neighbors. As a result, Hobbes argues, this world would be 
one of pure chaos and manifold in misery, a life of loneliness, despair, and 
constant threat; a world where even the worst moral transgression would go 
unpunished.29 Worst of all, there would be no drive for achievement or the 
bettering of one’s condition, for, Hobbes thinks, any project invested in could and 
probably would simply be taken by those with greater power. 
 
In such a condition there is no place for industry, because the fruit thereof 
is uncertain, and consequently, no culture of the earth, no navigation, nor 
use of commodities that may be imported by sea, no commodious 
building, no instruments of moving and removing such things as require 
much force,  no knowledge of the face of the earth, no account of time, no 
arts, no letters, no society, and which is worst of all, continual fear and 




 The solution to this condition, which, according to Hobbes, reason 
dictates, is that individuals create a social contract wherein we choose to limit our 
actions on the agreement that others do so as well. Although this contract limits 
one’s actions, this limitation ultimately leads to a more desirable state of affairs. 
But in order to make this contract successful, Hobbes argues, it must be 
enhanced by the threat of sanction through an individual or group endowed with 
                                                           
29
 This is because anything is justified in self-defense: “The Right of Nature, which writers 
commonly call jus naturale, is the liberty each man hath to use his own power … for the 
preservation of his own nature … and consequently of doing anything which, in his own judgment 
and reason, he shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto.” Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, 
ed. and trans. by Edwin Curley (Indianapolis, Ind. Hackett, 1994), p. 79. 
30
 Ibid., p. 76.  
 
 29 
the power of force because “Covenants without the sword are but words, and of 
no strength to secure man at all.”31  Thus, Hobbes concludes that governmental 
coercion is necessary for mitigating innately uncooperative human tendencies by 
means of a guaranteed social contract.  
 
Hardin’s Revision 
In the late 1960s, Garret Hardin explicated what he thought was the 
primary cause for environmental degradation in a famous essay that one of the 
primary causes of environmental degradation, rapid human population growth, 
was due to what he called “The Tragedy of the Commons.”32 The commons 
Hardin refers to are resources which are either owned by no one, or jointly by 
everyone in a given area, but are available to all users free of charge 
(contemporarily referred to as common-pool resources or CPRs). The tragedy of 
the commons is that in a commons setting, individuals are able to use resources 
without bearing the full brunt of the consequences, and that it becomes rational 
for an individual to over-exploit a given area because s/he receives the full 
benefits of overuse while everyone pay for the consequences.  
To illustrate this idea, consider the contemporary and painfully real 
problem of overfishing.33 Currently, much of the oceans are prime examples of 
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commons (owned by no one) and the overuse of these commons is having 
increasingly tragic effects.34 Those who can access the resources in this 
commons will seek to maximize personal gain. For example, fishers will each ask 
the question, “What is the utility to me of adding one more fish to my catch?” The 
answer is obvious; since the fisher receives all of the proceeds from the sale of 
each fish he or she catches, the gain is high. At the same time, because the 
effects of overfishing are born by all the fishers, the negative consequences are 
seemingly only a fraction of the positive consequences. As Hardin writes, 
 
Adding together the component partial utilities, the rational herdsman 
concludes that the only sensible course for him to pursue is to add another 
animal to his herd. And another; and another. . . , But this is the 
conclusion reached by each and every rational herdsman sharing a 
commons. Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked into a system that 
compels him to increase his herd without limit — in a world that is 
limited.35   
 
 
In scenarios of small communities that regulate themselves, or where 
there are few users employing low-impact technologies, it may be possible for 
each individual to take what they like without exceeding the replacement rate of 
renewable resources such as fish. But in modern day scenarios, where there are 
many users are coupled with high-impact technologies, the logic of the commons 
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is a terrifying prospect. The level of sustainable yield is forgotten, ignored or 
simply disbelieved by the individual who can gain positive benefits from over-
exploiting the commons.  
 Like Hobbes, Hardin sees social problems stemming directly from scarcity 
of resources and human nature. In each scenario, Hobbes’ state of nature and 
Hardin’s tragedy of the commons, the rational course for the individual leads to 
counterproductive ends in the group setting. Also, like Hobbes’ state of nature, 
the tragedy of the commons can be seen in terms of enforcing contracts. For 
Hobbes, the state of nature leads to perpetual warfare of all against all because 
there is no guarantee that any contract that is made will be kept. This concern is 
especially important because all participants must agree in order for the contract 
to work; if only some lay down their arms they are at the mercy of those who do 
not. Similarly, the only way to solve the tragedy of the commons is for all involved 
to restrain from exploiting the commons, and more specifically, to regulate the 
number of children that each family can have. So asks Hardin, how do we 
legislate temperance? “Experience indicates that it can be accomplished best 
through the mediation of administrative law . . . through mutual coercion mutually 
agreed upon by the majority of people affected”.36 
 
The Question of Human Nature 
Both Hobbes and Hardin lay out reasons why they feel governmental 
regulation is necessary for creating a stable (and in Hardin’s case sustainable) 
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society. Human nature, being inherently competitive and self-interested, 
becomes socially counterproductive in scenarios where desirable resources are 
limited and ungoverned. We cannot trust others to keep their word and so without 
governmental regulation, we are led inexorably towards the complete 
despoliation of the natural world. But is this necessarily true? Since Hobbes’ 
original formulation of this argument, there have been a number of criticisms 
launched against it, starting with the question of human nature. One problem of 
the argument for governmental regulation is that it turns on the modernist 
assumption that there is a fundamental human nature and that it is selfish, 
competitive and anti-social. This assumption is problematic for a couple of 
reasons. First, it is not clear that there is a single set of characterizations of 
human nature which aptly describes all people in all places. To claim that there is 
supposes a hubris it would be best to avoid. Second, even if one accepts the 
universality of human nature (or at least the universality of human nature within a 
specific culture) it is not clear why it should be as Hobbes’ describes. It is true 
that individuals do often act selfishly, diffident and so on, but this may be due to 
the warping influence of culture rather than human nature. Rousseau, for 
example, argued that humans were basically virtuous creatures corrupted by 
civilization.  
 
Above all, let us not conclude with Hobbes that because man has no idea 
of goodness he is naturally evil; that he is vicious because he does not 
know virtue; that he always refuses his fellow-men services he does not 
believe he owes them; nor that, by virtue of right he reasonably claims to 
things he needs, he foolishly imagines himself to be the sole proprietor of 
the whole universe. Reasoning upon the principles he establishes, this 
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author ought to have said that since the state of nature is that in which 
care of our self-preservation is the least prejudicial to the self-preservation 
of others, that state was consequently the best suited to peace and the 
most appropriate for the human race. He says precisely the opposite, 
because of having improperly included in the savage man’s care of self-
preservation the need to satisfy a multitude of passions which are the 
product of society and which have made laws necessary.37 
 
 
Anarchists have also come to challenge Hobbes’ assumptions concerning 
human nature, specifically that people are disinclined to engage in cooperative 
relationships. Petr Kropotkin, the influential 19th century Russian anarchist 
argued that cooperation is a fundamental part of nature to be found not only in 
insects like ants and bees, but also in indigenous tribes and civilized society. In 
his well known work Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution, Kropotkin, elaborating on 
the earlier work of Karl Kessler, argued that “besides the law of mutual struggle 
there is in Nature the law of mutual aid, which, for the success of the struggle of 
life, and especially for the progressive evolution of the species, is far more 
important than the law of mutual contest.”38  
The importance of this debate should not be underestimated. One of the 
reasons both Hobbes and Hardin falls back on governmental regulation is that 
human nature requires it. But if Kropotkin’s assessment is closer to the truth and 
humans are inherently cooperative, than governmental coercion would be 
unnecessary for creating functioning social institutions. In fact, some have 
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argued that governmental coercion may be worse than unnecessary, seeing it as 
the base for social ills.39 So how do we know whether government is necessary 
for optimal social behavior?  
The problem of human nature is one that has troubled philosophers for 
hundreds of years and it is unlikely that anything said here would persuade the 
reader one way or the other. Happily, the investigation of this paper does not 
require the final say on human nature, only a reasonable understanding of how 
humans behave in particular settings. Once human behavior can be predicted in 
particular conditions we can use that knowledge to develop optimal behavior for 
sustainability. 
 Hobbes argues that humans will be in a constant state of strife and 
turmoil without a sovereign power to regulate and enforce contracts. Hardin 
argues that humans will continue to exploit the environment without an external 
power to regulate and enforce sustainable behavior. How do these predictions 
match up with real-world scenarios? As it turns out, neither are entirely accurate.  
 
Refuting Hobbes 
One of the ways Hobbes seeks to bolster his argument is through 
observational evidence: 
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It may peradventure be thought, there was never such a time nor 
condition of war as this…, But there are many places, where they live so 
now. For the savage people in many places of America (except the 
government of small families, the concord whereof dependeth on natural 
lust) have no government at all, and live at this day in that brutish manner 
as I said before.40  
 
 
Of course, to Hobbes’ world, steeped in ethnocentrism and Christian bias, 
it did appear that the indigenous people living in America were enthralled in a life 
of constant strife and cultural impoverishment. Yet contemporary studies of 
indigenous cultures do more to contradict this conclusion than support it.  
To briefly recount the brutish manner of living that Hobbes thought was (in 
Hobbes’ terms) the savage people’s lot: “In such a condition there is no place for 
industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain, and consequently, no culture of 
the earth, no navigation, nor use of commodities that may be imported by sea, no 
commodious buildings . . . no arts, no letters, no society. . . .”41 The Mandan, an 
indigenous group located in what is present day North Dakota, serve as a striking 
counter-example to Hobbes argument. Not only were they noted agriculturalists- 
growing maize, squash, beans and sunflowers in river-bottom garden plots; but 
they dwelled in large, permanent earthlodges. These lodges, constructed by way 
of four center support posts and an outer wall of smaller logs, could hold up to 
thirty or forty people and villages usually had around 120 lodges.42 Contrary to 
Hobbes belief, at least one group of indigenous peoples in North America were 
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well-versed in the “culture of the earth” as well as the “construction of 
commodious buildings.” Furthermore, Mandan villages from prehistoric times 
were focal points for trade in the region and became centers of commerce during 
the 19th century, with steamboats traveling on the upper Missouri regularly 
docking in their territory. Thus, even Hobbes claim that they would have no use 
of commodities by sea is flawed, at least in regards to the Mandan as well as 
other tribes living in that area like the Assiniboine, Cree, Arikara, and Crow. As 
for the lack of society, depending on how Hobbes is to be interpreted, this claim 
is either too outlandish to take seriously or simply another misjudgment of the 
rich Amerindian culture found throughout the continent. The Mandan culture was 
abundant with ceremonies for such things as success in wartime and healthy 
crops and they are noted for an especially elaborate ceremony known as the 
Okipa; a four-day event which reenacted the creation of the earth and tested the 
strength of the warriors.43  
The Mandan provide an excellent counterexample to Hobbes’ claim that 
the “savage people in America” had no place for industry. But the question of 
Hobbes’ ethnocentrism is beside the point. After all, Hobbes’ claim was two-fold: 
that the indigenous populations lacked industry as well as government and that 
one was a necessary condition for the other. Yet, the early Mandan, who 
exemplify the civilized traits that Hobbes so strongly associated with government, 
were organized in a political system much closer to anarchism than any true form 
of government. As described by North American anthropologists, Mandan social 
structure was “under normal social circumstances . . . . regulated by tradition, 
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and bad luck would come to anyone who broke form tradition. When necessary, 
pressure was exerted by the family and clan.”44 It was only for ceremonial 
occasions that a group of select individuals acted as police. This form of coercion 
may be reasonably understood as a mixture of what anthropologist Harold 
Barclay calls diffuse and religious sanctions; the former being sanctions 
spontaneously applied by any one or more members of the community and the 
latter involving the supernatural (i.e. bad luck following the breaking of 
tradition).45 These forms of coercion are strikingly different from governmental 
coercion, where the state both creates and enforces laws. Although Mandan 
communities participated in elections and acknowledged authority figures, these 
leaders were unable to force others to obey their decisions and instead had to 
rely on oratorical skills and general charisma to convince others to follow them.46 
Thus, the Mandan provide an example of successful social organization (if 
one defines success by Hobbes’ standards, i.e., culture of the earth, 
commodious buildings, etc.) without governmental regulation. As it turns out, the 
Mandan are not unique in their accomplishments; there are a number of groups 
classifiable as “anarchic” that have been highly developed in terms of language 
and culture.47 Given current evolutionary knowledge though, it should not be 
surprising that governmental coercion is unnecessary for societies to flourish. 
Indeed, it is likely that any political structure that required more than rudimentary 
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social skills would have to had have evolved out of earlier, viable ethical 
structures. As Callicott has pointed out,  
 
The social contract theory and its subtler and more palatable 
descendants, utilitarianism and deontology, were not useful to Darwin 
because they ground ethics in reason, the most advanced and delicate of 
animal capacities. From an evolutionary point of view, however, reason 
could only have emerged in an intensely social environment, complete 
with a fully articulate language. But the emergence, persistence, and 
development of such a social environment depends, in turn, on the 
existence of ethics . . . 48   
 
 
In order to achieve the state of evolutionary and cultural development that 
Hobbes’ political organization requires, humans would have already needed to 
function at a reasonably cooperative level. If in a state of nature humans truly did 
act the way as Hobbes imagined they would, it is unclear how they would have 
survived to form the sorts of societies in which Hobbes found himself. Thus 
contrary to Hobbes’ prediction, empirical studies and evolutionary logic do not 
support the claim that those without government must endure perpetual conflict.  
 
Refuting Hardin 
What this line of thought shows is not that coercion is unnecessary for the 
making and keeping of contracts (the Mandan did use coercive techniques), but 
that governmental coercion is not a necessary condition. So how does this 
conclusion relate to the tragedy of the commons? According to Hardin, 
conscience is self-eliminating where irresponsibility is unrestrained, and 
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conscience and guilt are either not strong enough or directed towards the wrong 
end, creating anxiety rather than proper action. Consequently, Hardin believes 
we must rely on the powerful coercive force of the government in order to stop 
the tragedy of the commons.49 But just as the Mandan were able to use coercive 
measures different from governmental regulation in developing a flourishing 
society, individuals in tragedy-of-the-commons-like scenarios are able to use 
various methods for preventing over-exploitation.  
For example, Elinor Ostrom has demonstrated that communication is just 
as important as government regulation for solving environmental exploitation in a 
set of laboratory experiments designed to simulate the commons. In the 
experiment, subjects were given the opportunity to invest tokens into a market 
scenario that worked like a tragedy of the commons. One market gave a fixed 
rate of return, one-for-one, while the other gave a rate of return based on the 
number of other individuals concurrently investing. The less people investing in 
this market, the more money they made, but as more and more people invested, 
returns would shrink and eventually cost investors, just as would happen in an 
overgrazed field or over-polluted river. So a good rate of return would be made if 
all the investors exercised restraint, but the best return would be made by 
someone who did not exercise restraint when everyone else did.  
When subjects were given the opportunity to fine free-riders (those who 
chose not to restrain when everyone else did) but no chance to talk about a 
strategy they collectively earned only 9 percent of the maximum possible amount 
of return; yet, when allowed to communicate freely with no means to punish free-
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riders, returns were significantly higher (73 percent of the possible maximum 
amount of return).50 As explained in the study, “… these experiments suggest 
that covenants, even without a sword, have some force, while swords without a 
covenant may be worse than the state of nature.” 51 What Ostrom’s study shows 
is that there are factors beyond governmental coercion that are important in 
encouraging sustainable behavior. But in addition, it shows potential problems 
with governmental coercion; when the coercion interferes in factors important in 
fostering environmentally sustainable behavior, it can be counter-productive.  
The veracity of this conclusion can be been in field studies modeled after 
Ostrom’s results. For example, experiments simulating the tragedy of the 
commons in rural Columbian villages found that participants who were 
“confronted with external regulations . . . can in fact deviate from a group oriented 
strategy and concentrate in an individually oriented behaviour . . . [and that the] 
negative reciprocity was greatly enhanced by this externally imposed institution 
as verified by statistical analysis.” But this point is best illustrated by an anecdotal 
experience included in the report. After one of the experimental sessions, a 
participant commented how the game reminded her of a scenario involving her 
father who was having problems with a neighbor illegally shifting their dividing 
fence during the night.  
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She described how her father never approached the authorities to 
denounce the problem, and rather got involved in several arguments and 
conversations with his neighbor until they figured out a solution. I asked 
why he did not approached [sic] the authorities, and she explained that 
even if he might obtain the just outcome of moving back the fence, and the 
neighbour to be found in violation of the law [sic], he might have lost his 
neighbour forever.52  
 
 
By using an outside source to control conflict, emphasis on 
communication is directed toward the mediator and not those directly involved. 
Such redirection can lead to a breakdown of communication between the 
individual actors and thus a breach in trust and reciprocity. So an important 
variable in determining the extent to which individuals are willing to exploit a 
resource, namely open communication, can be inhibited by governmental 
regulation. Indeed, the field study found that a number of important variables may 
be excluded when relying on governmental regulation: “Reciprocity, trust, 
information, repetition, are all concepts often ignored when designing policies to 
correct institutional failures arising from externalities.”53  
So the limits of governmental regulation become clearer when looking at 
all the factors involved in behavior and environmental exploitation. Both Hobbes 
and Hardin assume that individuals will act to the detriment of the group when 
there is not an outside force (viz., governmental coercion) to assure that 
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contracts will be kept. Yet, empirical studies have shown that this outcome is not 
always the case and that contracts may be agreed upon and kept without 
governmental regulation.  
 
The Importance of Combining Ethics with Regulation 
Still, there is a major component of environmental problems that has not 
yet been mentioned. Environmental degradation involves more than a breach in 
contracts; it is heavily influenced by how one understands and relates to the 
environment. Hardin may be right that the tragedy of commons is partially 
responsible for placing whales on the endangered species list, but hunters must 
have a particular attitude toward whales to kill them in the first place. Likewise, 
citizens must have a particular attitude toward sustainability before governmental 
regulation can any hope of being affective.  
Take for example a recent rash of clear cutting taking place in Boiling 
Springs, North Carolina. Since February of 2006 the city has issued 368 logging 
permits, the vast majority being issued without accompanying building permits. 
Why? In February the federal Fish and Wildlife Service issued a notice that rapid 
development was threatening the habitat of the endangered red-cockaded 
woodpecker. The importance of that notice is that under the Endangered Species 
Act (ESA) of 1973, the federal government may be able to prevent development 
on private land if it is found to contain habitat for an endangered species.54 
Because private landowners were afraid of losing their development rights, they 
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began clearcutting the very habitat that the ESA set out to protect. Now it would 
be excessive to say that the landowners are cutting their pines simply because 
they lack a proper environmental ethic; even the most ardent birder might sweat 
at the thought of losing the development rights to their property. However 
someone who has no concern for endangered species certainly has no incentive 
to follow the spirit of the law if they can avoid it. In fact, those who care little for 
endangered species may decide it is better to kill any federally protected species 
that settles on their land rather than be subject to the stringent restrictions that 
would be placed on them.55  
The futility of trying to create a sustainable society without a 
corresponding ethic can be emphasized by looking once more at the tragedy of 
the commons. Governmental coercion can only work under conditions of 
constant supervision (or the impression of such by the public) with the 
corresponding belief that non-cooperation will be punished rapidly and severely. 
These conditions are particularly difficult to fulfill in the arena of environmental 
problems where the commons work on both a global and micro scale, places 
where coercion cannot find a toehold. For example, consider again the serious 
problem of overfishing. According to a study recently published in Science, 
overfishing is happening at such a pace that if it continues unabated, many more 
species will be lost, marine ecosystems will significantly degrade and there will 
be global collapse of all species currently fished within forty years. Indeed, 
researchers found that twenty-nine percent of species globally consumed have 
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been fished so heavily or were so affected by pollution or habitat loss that they 
were down to ten percent of previous levels.56 But the problem is quite literally as 
large as the ocean and impossible to completely regulate. One of the current 
solutions is a push for small no-take zones, known as Marine Protected Areas 
(MPA) that can be highly regulated. Though the initial results from the zones 
seem positive, there is still some question of how well they can work. For 
example, only about thirty-five percent of Carribean MPAs and ten to fifteen 
percent of Indo-Pacific MPAs are meeting their expected goals.57 One of the 
problems may be scientific, that there are large gaps of necessary knowledge for 
creating the appropriate reserves58; but it has also been argued that a significant 
problem is that MPAs lack the necessary community capacity, i.e., “the rules, 
procedures and values that people hold, which predispose them to work 
collectively for mutual benefit.”59 Without community capacity, opportunistic 
poachers are able to avoid the regulations in place, and they are able to do so in 
already highly regulated areas. What can be done about the rest of the seas?  
 Of course, without an environmental ethic, governmental coercion seems 
inadequate in dealing with the very small as well. Because of the nature of 
current technology, individuals have a much higher capacity to pollute than in the 
previous century. As one example, the EPA claims that one gallon of improperly 
disposed motor oil can potentially pollute 250,000 gallons of drinking water; 
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enough water to supply fifty people for a year.60 Naturally then, improper disposal 
of motor oil is illegal; yet 120 million gallons are still poured down storm drains 
and tossed in the trash every year.61 Now there are probably a number of 
reasons for such enormous non-compliance: that the penalties aren’t harsh 
enough, or that the law is not enforced enough. Yet, there is no doubt that oil 
dumping is simply impractical to police. Short of barring do-it-yourself oil 
changes, it would be impossible to regulate where all waste oil ends up. 
Unfortunately, potential pollution nightmares not only run our cars but our TVs, 
laptops, iPods, Blackberrys, and cell phones as well, in short, all the trappings 
that make modern life modern. How can we hope to effectively monitor the 
disposal of the millions of toxic products that permeate our society? 
Of course, it is not only the general public that needs to be regulated. As 
Garret Hardin has pointed out, there is an ancient question associated with 
government authority: Quis custodiet ipsos custodes — “Who shall watch the 
watchers themselves?”62 Though a coercively structured society may be able to 
compel the ruled to follow laws, how will it compel the rulers and especially those 
who follow the rules? Environmental economists Richard Stroup and John 
Baden, working under the same premise as Hardin and Hobbes that “individuals 
[will] seek their own advantage within prevailing institutional arrangements,” 
come to the conclusion that  
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Institutional rules always allow governmental officials some discretion in 
determining access to resources. Claimants, therefore, have an incentive 
to invest in activities that might produce administrative outcomes favorable 
to themselves. Under these circumstances, some corruption exists in 
every political system. Informational lobbying, potential shifts of campaign 
support, actual or threatened lawsuits, and even bribery can all be brought 
to bear — at a cost — by those who wish to gain favorable decision from 
governmental policymakers who control the rights to resources.63 
 
 
Ultimately then, at some level governmental coercion must coincide with a 
sustainability ethic, either at the level of the enforcers or the population at large.  
  
Conclusion 
This is not to say that governmental regulation is always and necessarily 
counterproductive as a solution to environmental problems, only to point to 
certain limitations in this approach. To expect to rely completely on governmental 
regulation for creating optimal behavior would be folly for a number of reasons. 
For one thing, it doesn’t work. There are a number of factors besides coercion 
that are responsible for behavior towards environmental degradation, many of 
which can be inhibited by governmental regulation. Also, regulation can be futile 
without a corresponding ethic and, as the situation in Boiling Springs shows, it 
can even be counterproductive. Finally, governmental regulation is limited 
because it cannot be everywhere at all times. Thus, while governmental coercion 
can be helpful in creating optimal behavior, it has serious limitations. Yet, these 
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limitations may be transcended when working in tandem with solutions that focus 

























PERSONAL MORAL STANDARDS 
 
The Gap between Beliefs and Behavior 
The third problem that hinders the sustainable society involves a 
translation of beliefs to conduct. As shown in the previous two sections, in order 
to develop a sustainable society the individual must have a strong sense of 
personal responsibility and moral commitment. Even strong governmental 
coercion cannot achieve the goals of sustainability without a general disposition 
of the public to act in an environmentally friendly manner, there are simply not 
enough enforcement officers to compel everyone at all times. So a necessary 
component on the path to sustainability is an instilling of an environmental 
conscience. Doing so would act as a self-regulatory mechanism that could 
perform the job that governmental coercion cannot — educating and regulating 
daily personal behavior.  
Now the importance of developing an environmental ethic is not a new 
idea. It springs naturally from the belief that moral education is the bedrock for a 
stable and healthy society.64 Consequently, environmental philosophers have 
realized for years that an environmental ethic is essential for creating and 
supporting the change necessary for creating a sustainable world. Likewise, 
many have argued that education is a necessary step in achieving sustainability. 
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Aldo Leopold argued that “obligations have no meaning without conscience, and 
the problem we face is the extension of the social conscience from people to 
land.”65 Consequently, he devoted a large amount of time to education and 
spreading ecological literacy in the hopes of creating an ecological ethic.66 
Eugene C. Hargrove has argued in favor of developing school curriculum for 
environmental citizenship, where children learn about the history of 
environmentalism and how American environmental values arose in a historical 
context.67 Callicott has argued that what is needed is not just a change in 
knowledge but an entire reframing of the cultural world view: “the political 
implementation of environmental ethics . . . will follow upon the transition of the 
prevailing worldview from a Baconian-Cartesian-Newtonian model to a 
Darwinian-Einsteinian-Leopoldian model.”68 Of course, there are a number of 
philosophers who emphasize the importance of a moral education in order to 
create an upright, responsible, and sustainable citizen and this is just a small 
sampling.69  
Now because this is a topic that much time and energy has been devoted 
to, there has been ample discussion on the many potential problems with moral 
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education.70 Yet, one problem that has received relatively little attention involving 
an environmental ethic has not so much to do with how it is taught, or even how it 
is received and understood by students, but rather what comes after individuals 
have received and retained proper moral education.  
It is intuitive that one’s moral beliefs ought to translate directly into action 
prescribed by those moral standards, yet studies have shown that this is not 
always the case. For example, one study that interviewed members of a 
population control organization active in the U.S. during 1970’s (Zero Population 
Growth a.k.a. ZPG, now called The Population Connection) found that “Among 
ZPG members under 30 years of age . . . the majority of those cognizant of the 
necessity of the one-child family intended to have two natural children, even 
when they felt the United States was already greatly overpopulated.”71 Another 
study that took place in Perth, Australia, found that consumers who had strong 
beliefs regarding personal responsibility towards conserving energy continued to 
consume high levels of electricity even when told of their high consumption and 
given tips on how to conserve. Only a group of subjects who were explicitly 
informed that their consumption patterns and values did not match cut electricity 
use, and even this reduction did not last beyond two weeks.72 The surprising 
thing about these two studies is that they involve examples of individuals who 
have a well developed environmental ethic and presumably, a strong sense of 
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personal responsibility. In the ZPG study, the individuals being interviewed were 
among the most knowledgeable and concerned with population growth (so much 
so as to voluntarily join an organization created to curtail it), and yet they failed to 
restrain themselves. The second study concerned a less involved group, but 
these were individuals who had stated in a survey that people bear a personal 
duty to conserve energy. Clearly both groups had strongly developed attitudes 
pertaining to the environment, yet they both failed to act in ways consistent with 
their attitudes. Consequently, if moral education is going to be useful in creating 
a sustainable society, there needs to be a serious look at the connection 
between one’s attitude and one’s actions.  
 
Social Cognitive Theory and Moral Disengagement 
The idea that morals regulate behavior has some empirical backing and it 
makes intuitive sense.73 Society works to control negative behavior by social 
censure and other unfavorable consequences. Moral standards, on the other 
hand, control behavior through self-condemnation and self-satisfaction. When 
individuals act in accordance with their moral standards, it gives them positive 
self-reactions and when they act against them, they experience self-censure.74 
Furthermore, these reactions (self-approval and self-censure) are fairly strong 
self-regulating mechanisms of action because self-contempt is one of the worst 
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punishments. People rarely wish to violate their own moral standards. 
Consequently, when individuals do not act in ways consistent with their values, 
there must be something inhibiting these self-regulating mechanisms. Albert 
Bandura, a leading psychologist at Stanford University and the founder of Social 
Cognitive Theory (SCT) argues that often what inhibits these self-regulating 
mechanisms is  something called moral disengagement: the ability to cognitively 
redefine scenarios where one’s values and behaviors conflict. As a result, 
disengagement is a powerful obstacle in the path from attitude to conduct 
because it alleviates internal regulating mechanisms.  
Originally, models of human behavior took an extremely mechanistic 
approach, understanding behavior entirely in terms of observable acts described 
by stimulus-response characteristics.75 SCT breaks from traditional behaviorism 
by placing the self-regulation of conduct (that is, how individuals act when 
confronted with an ethical decision) neither squarely in the camp of personal 
autonomy nor in the hands of social determinists. Instead, SCT argues that 
behavior is regulated by both social sanctions and internalized self-sanctions. 
Social sanctions control negative behavior by social censure and other 
unfavorable consequences. Internal regulations influence behavior through self-
condemnation and self-satisfaction; when individuals fail to act in accordance 
with their moral standards, they experience self-reproof, whereas when they act 
in accordance with their moral standards they experience positive self-reactions. 
Thus while social sanctions may heavily influence behavior, internal sanctions 
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can often be stronger because individuals like to think highly of themselves and 
there is no greater punishment than self-contempt. 76 
If so, then there should be a strong correlation between personal 
standards and conduct because individuals would want to avoid self-
condemnation. Yet, as has already been pointed out, such correlation is not 
always the case. What Bandura argues is that when people’s actions conflict with 
their moral standards, they use different cognitive methods to prevent self-
regulatory mechanisms from activating. The gap between moral thought and 
action comes not from improper moral education or an undeveloped set of 
personal standards, but rather from the ease with which someone can disengage 
from self-regulating mechanisms.  
To illustrate this point, consider a recent study described in the New York 
Times. Professors at Iowa State University and the University of Arkansas 
decided to see how a group of students who had cheated on a take-home exam 
would score on a standard test of moral judgment. As it turned out, the scores on 
the moral judgment test failed to correlate with the degree to which students were 
cheating. In fact, one of the most dishonest students scored highest on the 
morals test.77 Yet, these students, even the most dishonest, were not lacking in 
moral education because they understood what constituted ethical behavior and 
saw themselves as conforming to it. What accounted for the difference in actual 
conduct was the student’s ability to rectify their actions. For example, one student 
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was quoted as saying, “I think it’s hard for people not to look at the answer 
manual if it’s available,” which effectively displaced moral blame from the student 
to the teacher. Another student justified his actions by comparing them to the 
actions of other students, “I really don’t consider working with another person that 
unethical78. . . [although] Taking and copying answers from the key was highly 
unethical.”79  
What happens is that individuals use different methods of moral 
disengagement or distancing to cognitively change how they see their own 
conduct. It is not that the students are lacking in self-standards — quite the 
opposite. The students attempted to cognitively change the morality of their 
action in order to fall in line with their self-imposed moral standards. None of the 
students readily admitted to cheating, something that would have undoubtedly 
rendered self-censure. Rather, they attempted to describe their actions in such a 
way that they would not qualify as cheating, or at the very least not deserving of 
self-censure.  
SCT identifies three points in the behavioral process where 
disengagement can occur. The first point is in how the conduct itself is construed, 
where individuals use moral justification, palliative comparisons, or euphemistic 
labeling to justify the act.  The second point is how one relates to an action, by 
distorting or obscuring the relation between actions and the harm they cause, 
moral agents are able to minimize the sense of personal responsibility. The last 
point for disengagement concerns how people view the victims of an action; 
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dehumanizing or attributing blame to a victim can make the consequences of 
their actions seem minute or even deserved.80 
Now the use of moral disengagement is not necessarily problematic. For 
one thing, it keeps individuals from becoming emotionally overwhelmed. Some 
professions such as psychotherapy or those who staff social welfare programs 
require high levels of disengagement because they experience many people 
affected deeply by poverty, disease and years of neglect. Were such 
professionals to fully empathize with their clients, they would be too overwhelmed 
to continue in the occupation. Disengagement works as a moderating device to 
reduce impairing personal distress.81 Also, moral disengagement is evolutionarily 
adaptive because it maintains psychological well-being when the transgression of 
moral taboos might be necessary. The Inuit, for example, routinely practiced 
infanticide to keep population levels in check with environmental constraints. 
Such a grisly and biologically counter-intuitive practice would strongly go against 
the ingrained moral taboo of killing humans. 82 In modern-day circumstances, 
moral disengagement provides emotional well-being of those who may find 
themselves enmeshed in social structures which require actions contrary to their 
moral standards. A recent study involving prison executions found that staff 
members on execution teams are more likely than other prison guards to justify 
execution through a variety of disengagement mechanisms. Because the 
                                                           
80
 Bandura, Social Foundations of Thought and Action (London: Prentice-Hall, 1986), pp. 375-85. 
81
 Ibid., pp. 383-84. 
82
 See Marvin Harris, Cows, Pigs, Wars and Witches; The Riddles of Culture (New York: Random 
House, 1974). However, it should be noted that his conclusions have recently been challenged; 
for example see Eric Alden Smith and S. Abigail Smith, "Inuit Sex-Ratio Variation: Population 




members of the execution team are involved with a direct conflict of the 
socialized norm that killing is wrong, it is not surprising that they would make the 
heaviest use of disengagement techniques. Furthermore, the study found that 
the execution support team,83 while highly engaged initially, became less so as 
the number of executions increased. In fact, by the time they had participated in 
15 executions their level of disengagement no longer differed significantly from 
their counterparts on the execution team. 84  
The recorded levels of disengagement in this study, especially for the 
support staff, illustrate the ameliorative properties of disengagement. By using 
disengagement techniques individuals faced with distressing scenarios 
(specifically, those on the execution squad) were able to minimize personal 
involvement in the execution process and perform actions that, in other 
conditions, elicit self-condemnation (i.e., killing a human being). Still, the enabling 
effects of moral disengagement should not be taken lightly. They are precisely 
what allow ordinary, rational and otherwise moral individuals to commit brutal 
acts.  
One of the most prominent examples of this was the functioning and 
psychology of genocide in Nazi Germany. When Hannah Arendt covered the trial 
of Adolph Eichmann, she found that the high ranking Nazi officer was not a moral 
monster but a rather relatively normal individual with an extraordinary ability to 
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not think about what he was doing.85 Similarly, a number of holocaust 
researchers have made note of the Nazi regime’s ability to enroll decent, ordinary 
individuals to do extraordinarily cruel things. For example, Arendt notes that the 
Nazi hierarchy was surprised at the ease with which the German civil service 
adapted to handling paperwork concerning the Final Solution. No doubt there 
ability to do so was readily facilitated by moral disengagement through the 
fragmented goal structure of the civil service structure. Responsibility was 
diffused because workers neither made the decisions concerning the Final 
Solution nor carried out the final acts.86 Likewise, Hitler’s eugenics project was 
ultimately carried out with the complicity of competent and sometimes prestigious 
medical doctors. Part of the reason these doctors were willing to perform the 
killings was the ability of the regime to effectively utilize moral disengagement by 
diffusing and displacing responsibility: 
 
In the entire sequence — from the reporting of the cases by midwives or 
doctors, to the supervision of such reporting by institutional heads, to 
expert opinions rendered by central consultants, to coordination of the 
marked forms by Health Ministry officials, to the appearance of the child at 
the Reich Committee institution for killing — there was at no point a sense 
of personal responsibility for, or even involvement in, the murder of 
another human being. Each participant could feel like no more than a 
small cog in a vast, officially sanctioned, medical machine.87 
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So although a strong ethic may be important in developing standards for 
self-regulation, moral disengagement significantly affects the extent to which self-
regulation will be activated. Even deeply entrenched moral standards such as the 
taboo against killing humans may be violated when coupled with strong 
disengagement mechanisms. Consequently, identifying areas for disengagement 
in behavior towards the environment is of the utmost importance for 
implementing an ethic conducive to sustainability. As mentioned earlier, a strong 
environmental ethic is necessary for behaving in a sustainable manner because 
governmental coercion cannot work alone. Yet, a strong environmental ethic 
must be readily engaged in order to be affective in regulating behavior. So by 
identifying and minimizing scenarios conducive to disengagement, there is a 
greater degree of likelihood that individuals will behave in a sustainable manner.  
 
Disengagement and Environmental Ethics 
Although moral disengagement has traditionally been used in explaining 
the perpetration of human to human maltreatment, it is equally useful in 
understanding human abuse towards the environment. Of course, before moral 
disengagement can be used to explain transgressive behavior, there must be 
some assessment of what constitutes transgressive behavior in the first place.88 
This assessment is easier in the case of inhumanities; many will readily agree 
that killing an innocent human violates moral standards especially in the case of 
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genocide. But what constitutes moral transgressions in terms of the natural world 
is rarely agreed upon by the general public. Fortunately, this thesis is primarily 
concerned with those individuals who already hold foundational beliefs toward 
the environment so it is not unreasonable to assume the morality of some basic 
actions. So instead of choosing and defending one value system that defines 
proper environmental behavior, and consequently, the legitimacy or illegitimacy 
of specific acts, it will be more helpful to show simply how disengagement 
facilitates specific acts that would reasonably be regarded as unfriendly to the 
environment.   
Recall the main areas where disengagement occurs, the first being how 
harmful action is reconstrued to appear neutral. One of the primary ways of 
accomplishing this is through convoluted and sanitized language which masks 
the detrimental conduct and consequently reduces the individual’s sense of 
moral agency. As Bandura notes, “Euphemisms are extensively used in everyday 
life when people have to do things that bring personal benefit but harm others. In 
such situations, they preserve their self-esteem by characterizing what they do in 
benign language.”89 Such language can appear in a variety of ways in 
environmental problems. For example, euphemized language shows up when 
talking about pollution: “The acid rain that is killing our lakes and forests loses its 
acidity when it is called ‘atmospheric deposition of anthropogenically derived 
substances.’ It’s pretty hard to get exercised over anthopogenically derived 
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substances. ‘Acid rain’ is a different story.”90 In a similar vein, environmental 
issues are often described in ways that obscure the agentic nature of the 
problems. Species are lost or disappear, a wording of extinction that minimizes 
human responsibility in the problems. In truth, species are not lost in the usual 
sense of the word; they are continually pushed to extinction from human habits, 
attitudes and actions.  
Another area where disengagement often occurs is when individuals are 
distanced from the harmful outcomes of their acts. Self-sanctions are most 
strongly activated when personal responsibility for an action is unequivocal. 
Thus, one way of cognitively distancing oneself from the consequences of an 
action is the displacement of responsibility onto another individual. In this way, 
individuals are spared self-sanctions because they are not the actual agent of the 
acts. Most of the research regarding the displacement of responsibility involves 
hierarchical systems and figure of authority. But globalization and economic 
practices have evolved news ways to displace responsibility for one’s actions. 
Wendell Berry describes the economic abdication of responsibility in this way,  
 
What has happened is that most people in our country, and apparently 
most people in the ‘developed’ world, have given proxies to the 
corporations to produce and provide all of their food, clothing, and shelter. 
Moreover, they are rapidly giving proxies to corporations or governments 
to provide entertainment, education, child care, care of the sick and the 
elderly, and many other kinds of ‘service’ that once were carried on 
informally and inexpensively by individuals or households or communities. 
Our major economic practice, in short, is to delegate the practice to 
others.91  
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With the delegation of these activities also goes the delegation of 
responsibility associated with them. If the farmer who supplies strawberries uses 
methyl bromide (a fumigant linked with ozone depletion), it is not the buyer’s 
responsibility; it is the farmer’s. If burning coal puts mercury in the ocean, it is the 
responsibility of the coal company, not the consumer. In this way, there is a large 
gap placed between one’s desire and support for an action and the 
consequences of that action. This displacement of responsibility helps one to 
understand counterproductive actions of some environmentalists. Recall Sagoff’s 
quote, 
 
I speed on the highway; yet I want the police to enforce laws against 
speeding. I used to buy mixers in returnable bottles — but who can bother 
to return them? I buy only disposable now, but to soothe my conscience, I 
urge my state senator to outlaw one-way containers. I love my car; I hate 
the bus. Yet I vote for candidates who promise to tax gasoline to pay for 
public transportation.92  
 
 
Even though Sagoff clearly recognizes his role in the exacerbation of 
particular environmental problems, he feels less responsibility for his actions 
because it is being displaced onto policy makers. As stated in his own word, he 
pushes for governmental responsibility to soothe his own conscience.  
Another method lightening the moral load tied to the consequences of an 
action is by diffusing responsibility and obscuring the consequences. In the 
environmental realm, these two methods for disengagement often work in 
tandem and consequently represent one of the largest barriers to reconciling 
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environmental attitudes with environmentally friendly behavior. The reason for 
this is because our social structure and economic system tend to create a 
perpetual amnesia in regards to product consumption. Garbage is literally thrown 
away, water mysteriously appears out of the faucet and disappears down the 
drain, and heat comes from a thermostat on the wall and appears through vents 
on the floors and ceilings. Even when one knows the consequences of an action, 
such as buying food grown with pesticides that run-off into water ways and 
disrupt food-chains, the consequences of those acts are obscured by the 
marketplace. Items for consumption are presented as whole entities; devoid of 
any past production. How the product was made, in what conditions, how much 
energy was used, where it comes from, the raw materials that compose it, etc. 
Essentially, the overall impact of the product is left off the label and consequently 
off the consumer’s mind. It is easier to buy ‘conventional’ produce when the 
ramifications are left unsaid. In fact, the amount of obscurity regarding 
consumption can be seen in the anecdotal stories of children confusing the 
grocery store and not earth as the origin of our food.93 Furthermore, current 
market interactions are designed so the consumer prefers ignorance. The story 
of a product’s life, the producer, the packager, the marketer, the materials, have 
all been sundered from the purchasing experience. The interchange between 
buyer and seller can offer no ethical guidance. 94 Indeed, the economic system 
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asks us to make decisions based only on personal interests, as a self-interested 
consumer rather than a moral agent and concerned citizen.95  In this way, the 
desire to investigate the impact of consumption is checked at the door by slick 
marketing and instant gratification. This encourages blind consumption at a cost 
of personal values. In order to make moral decisions we need to have some 
capacity for gaining knowledge, reflecting on motives, predicting outcomes, 
criticizing principles and so forth. All of these conditions are inhibited by the 
current social structure and can produce an unintended contradiction of our own 
established ethical guidelines. As an environmentalist, I wish to see rain forests 
flourish; yet, as a consumer, I may be purchasing products utilizing irresponsible 
swidden agriculture. As a humanitarian, I may deplore slavery but support the 
slave trade through chocolate consumption. Though I am quite clear with where I 
stand in regards to groundwater pollution, I am not so clear as to where my 
coffee stands. 
Recently, a journalist wrote a book that followed the path of a conventional 
meal back to its numerous and unexpected origins. What he found was that the 
end product sold to the consumer is often a highly sanitized conception that 
rarely, if ever, hints at its makings. To give one dramatic example, the author 
traces the origins of a McDonald’s meal and finds that it is composed mainly of 
corn, an item that fails to appear on the menu at all. Yet the corn is there, it feeds 
the cows and chickens which are made into hamburger and nuggets. It also 
supplies the sugar source for the soft drinks and milk shakes. In fact, it shows up 
in the bun and ketchup, in the salad dressings and sauce for the nuggets and 
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even in the french fries, which are often deep fried in a vegetable oil composed of 
corn. All in all, the author gave a rough calculation of six pounds of corn for a 
meal that feeds that three. 96 But it is not simply that corn is hidden from view in 
the conventional fast food meal, the fertilizer and pesticides used in the corn’s 
production, the mountains of manure from the cattle lots, the energy that goes 
into growing, transporting and storing, all of these are concealed in the daily 
interactions with products. In fact, many other factors go into a meal that even 
the most concerned consumer might miss. A chicken nugget for example 
contains several completely synthetic ingredients with names and origins foreign 
to the lay person.  
 
But perhaps the most alarming ingredient in a Chicken McNugget is 
tertiary butylhydroquinone, or TBHQ, an antioxidant derived from 
petroleum that is either sprayed directly on the nugget or the inside of the 
box it comes in to “help preserve freshness.” According to A Consumer’s 
Dictionary of Food Additives, TBHQ is a form of butane (i.e., lighter fluid) 
the FDA allows processors to use sparingly in our food: It can comprise no 
more than 0.02 percent of the oil in a nugget. Which is probably just as 
well, considering that ingesting a single gram of TBHQ can cause 
“nausea, vomiting, ringing in the ears, delirium, a sense of suffocation, and 
collapse.” Ingesting five grams of TBHQ can kill.97  
 
Although these facts, if widely known, would no doubt strongly affect 
consumer habits, they are largely obscured with consumer complacence, brought 
about by a system that already works in a highly secretive manner. Although 
unknowingly eating TBHQ is not caused by moral disengagement per se (as the 
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actor is unaware of the consequences of their actions), it is strongly facilitated by 
a system which encourages disengagement.   
The distancing of consequences is further facilitated by society’s growing 
emphasis on disciplinarity and expertise leading to a hyper-specialized division of 
labor.98 This emphasis can act as a tool for disengaging because massive 
projects are separated into seemingly harmless and independent tasks. 
Furthermore, the goals of each of the subtasks often work independent of the 
goal of the larger project. As one article points out, 
 
A help-wanted ad for a technician to [make napalm] would describe the 
skills required for that specific function, not the organization’s end 
products . . . The technician does not accommodate the speed and quality 
of his or her work to the number of people napalmed, but responds to 
monetary incentives, group production norms, the orders given by 
supervisors, and so on.99  
 
 
Similarly, with regards to the overfishing of the oceans, stopping 
unsustainable harvesting is not just a matter of catching a few unsavory 
individuals. Currently overfishing happens through a worldwide network of 
reputable members of society who contribute through seemingly independent 
labors which insulate them from personal responsibility. One group manufactures 
the tools and techniques used in unsustainable harvesting. Another purchases 
the harvests for selling to the public. Others advertise and market the catch. Still 
others store, stock, and order them. Finally, the general public consumes them. 
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By fragmenting and dispersing the various labors involved, contributors all see 
themselves as decent and legitimate practitioners of their trade rather than 
parties to the collapse of the oceans.100 
The final area of disengagement involves how people view the victims of 
their actions. In terms of harms committed against other humans, it generally 
takes the form of dehumanization. Though dehumanization hardly seems 
appropriate for harms against the environment (considering it is comprised 
mainly of non-humans), it is still applicable to the natural world. Lexically, to 
dehumanize someone is to deprive them of human qualities or attributes. In 
terms of moral judgment, this would mean the stripping away of characteristics 
which afford moral consideration as well as empathetic or vicarious suffering. 
Silver and Geller have explained dehumanization in this way: 
 
When a person, P, is considering an act in relation another, O, there is a 
culturally determined range of attributes of O that is relevant to P in 
deciding upon his act. The most important part of this range consists of 
P’s awareness of O as an actor who has his or her own perception of the 
situation and desires and goals relating to that situation. In a dehumanized 
relationship, the range of perception is narrowed to only that which is 
relevant to P’s carrying out a particular task at a particular time. O’s 
attributes as an actor with desires and goals are not attended to by P.101  
 
 
Silver and Geller see O’s morally relevant qualities as having a “his or her 
own perception of the situation and desires and goals relating to that situation.” 
Yet, the morally relevant qualities of an enitity will be dependent on whichever 
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value system is doing the judging. Animal rights activists for example, will see a 
broader set of morally relevant qualities such as sentience or being the subject-
of-a-life.102 If working from a biocentric or ecocentric framework, the morally 
relevant qualities may broaden again, possibly including criteria such as 
autopoiesis, containing a teleological center of life, or an entity’s function in an 
ecosystem.103 Given these possible value systems, how might dehumanization 
occur? 
One way is through language. In terms of human to human conduct, 
renaming is one of the most effective ways of dehumanizing a victim. As one 
author describes:  
 
Let me tell you how to kill people efficiently. . . . First you have got to call 
your proposed victims names. . . .  if we propose to kill a fellow human 
being and justify it, we have to redescribe him in such a way that he no 
longer belongs to us, becomes an alien being. . . . and in that way the 
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 Animal rights activist, Carol J. Adams has noted the use of technique in 
reference to animals: “Language distances us further from animals by naming 
them as objects as ‘its,’ . . . Just as the generic ‘he’ erases female presence, the 
generic ‘it’ erases the living, breathing nature of the animals and reifies their 
object status.”105 One may also note this happening in terms of the environment 
as well. Terminology that refers to the natural world as products or resources 
dehumanize by reinforcing just one dimension of the entities in question, the 
dimension of utility for human kind. Scott Friskics, who develops the notion of a 
dialogue with the natural world, refers to this sort of dehumanization:  
 
Most of us have so little direct contact that there are few opportunities for 
hearing. Or what’s worse, we take up with [nature’s] creatures the same 
way we take up with our artifacts, denying their autonomy and eloquence, 
reducing them to their function and structure, and defining them in terms 
of humanly conferred values and uses. In other words, we transform 




 It should be emphasized that this particular example is mostly applicable 
to those who ascribe to specific value systems like ecocentrism which senses an 
inherent value in the natural world. But this sort of dehumanization, i.e., the 
stripping away of morally considerable characteristics, is one that is often 
facilitated by economics, language, and the notion of efficiency.107 Even if one 
does not fully agree with ecocentric value judgments, there is still need to be 
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wary of scenarios that use language to subtly frame important moral 
considerations.  
There is one final point to make regarding moral disengagement as an 
inhibitor of self-sanctioning conduct. As pointed out earlier, disengagement 
should always be avoided because it can prevent emotional exhaustion in 
circumstances where actions and beliefs readily conflict (like in the case of public 
executioners). Problems develop when excessive disengagement occurs, when 
someone beings to continually inhibit self-reproach. To illustrate this point, it is 
helpful to recall Callicott’s argument concerning environmental ethics and 
individual actions. Callicott begins the argument by pointing out that in 
comparison with other types of ethical orientations, environmentalists seem 
downright hypocritical. Because environmentalists seem to do a lot of things 
contrary to their beliefs. An animal rights activist will refuse to eat meat, a woman 
against abortion will not have one, and a pacifist will refuse to serve in war. Yet, 
an environmentalist may eat seafood from overfished oceans, drive a gas-
guzzling SUV in the midst of a carbon crisis, have six children, buy foods grown 
with pesticides, or all of the above. Callicott resolves this seeming hypocrisy by 
arguing that environmental problems are holistic and thus require a political 
solution to be successful, whereas other ethical domains such as animal rights or 
fetal rights are individualistic and can be resolved through individual action. But 
as I showed earlier, individual actions are necessary for solving environmental 
problems. Because individual actions have a very real effect both in terms of 
physical and cultural impact. Taken over time, individual actions can lead to 
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dumpsters of trash, pounds of pesticides, tons of carbon emissions, and so on. 
Furthermore, it is safe to say that most environmentalists already believe that 
individual actions make a difference. The strongest proof of this point is recycling, 
which almost all environmentalists participate in, even collective-action 
environmentalists.108 Why recycle if our individual actions have no real effect? 
The reason is because recycling does make some difference, small though it 
may be, and it is consistent with environmental values. But if individual actions do 
make a difference, as is implicitly acknowledged by the vast majority of 
environmentalists, why don’t they choose to live lifestyles fully consistent with 
their values? 
The answer most likely lies in the ease and ability with which 
environmental beliefs can be put into practice. If all environmental decision were 
separated into practical, easily applicable rights and wrongs like animal rights or 
fetal rights decision (eating a chicken salad vs. gazpacho or having an abortion 
vs. not having one), then there were would be much less reason to see 
environmental ethics as something specific to the group than to the individual. 
The argument for seeing environmental ethics in a holistic manner is based more 
on the frustration and inability for an environmentalist to act in a truly consistent 
way than on the insignificance of individual actions. In the developed world, to 
truly minimize one’s impact on the environment it is not enough to ride the bus or 
even live off the electrical grid; one has to live independent of the entire 
civilization grid: no electricity, growing or harvesting one’s food, walking for 
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transportation (even bicycles use possibly environmentally degrading parts like 
mined metals, oil as lubrication, industrial rubber, etc.), making one’s clothes and 
so on. Besides this sort of lifestyle not being desirable to many people, it quite 
arguably is not even a possibility. When the question of consistency comes up, it 
is no wonder that fetal rights activists are consistent when environmental activists 
are not. Environmental ethics distinguish themselves strongly from other ethics 
by requiring a far more stringent application of behavior; the difference between 
ethical domains isn’t one of holism versus individualism, but rather the degree of 
behavioral change associated with each ethic. While the abortion opponent may 
be faced with an unwanted pregnancy once or twice in a lifetime, the 
environmentalist is continually making decisions regarding appropriate behavior. 
Even if one recycles, he or she may still drive. Even if one rides a bike and 
recycles, he or she may still eat factory-farmed meat that pollutes groundwater 
and promotes industrial agriculture. 
Leopold described the heartrending position for environmentalists more 
than sixty years ago: “One of the penalties of an ecological education is that one 
lives alone in a world of wounds. Much of the damage inflicted on land is quite 
invisible to laymen.”109 What happens to those who quite regularly see the 
damage? “[One] must either harden his shell and make believe that the 
consequences of science are none of his business, or he must be the doctor who 
sees the marks of death in a community that believes itself well and does not 
want to be told otherwise.”110 Now suppose that one is not only ecologically 
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savvy to the damage inflicted on the land but also aware that his or her individual 
actions are in some sense responsible for the “marks of death”? Leopold’s advice 
for these unfortunate individuals may well have been from the passage quoted 
earlier, “you are the market . . . . If you want conservation wheat, you will have to 
raise it yourself.” But his advice was given at a different time, in a different 
culture. The constrictions of today’s realities, hyper-specialization, and division of 
labor mixed with an unbreakable reliance on a capitalist economic system render 
Leopold’s advice obsolete. In the first half of the twentieth century, the 
consequences of individual actions on environmental degradation were relatively 
easy to diagnose and change in comparison to today. One cannot even eat 
lunch, whether made at home or at a restaurant, without encountering multiple 
morally questionable practices regarding the ecological footprint of the meal. 
Was it organic? Factory-farmed? Did the farmers use negative practices in terms 
of soil and water conservation? How far did it travel to get to my plate? Yet if one 
is to grow his or her own food (and most people lack the equipment, land, 
endurance and general know-how to subsist solely from their own hand), he or 
she must sacrifice many, many hours of time and labor for something so easily 
gained in the conventional world. This is the heart of the environmentalists’ 
dilemma; we are born into a world of wounds which we unwillingly and even 







If an environmental ethic is going to be effective at regulating behavior, it 
must be complemented with social and economic systems that encourage an 
awareness between actions and consequences, a reminder of the morally 
considerable characteristics of the environment and ultimately, a realistic 
evaluation of one’s actions. Unfortunately, it is not currently so complimented and 
as has been pointed out, many of the conditions of modern life are conducive to 
disengagement and these conditions are reinforced by institutions and power 
structures.  Still, it is possible to suggest initial ways to create change within 
these systems to minimize the chances of irresponsible disengagement.  
 
Developing Environmental Empathy  
As stated before, one way that disengagement can take place is through 
dehumanization, where individuals reconstrue the perceived harm of an action by 
ignoring morally considerable aspects of an entity. To illustrate how 
dehumanization of the environment may be minimized, it will be helpful to 
compare how it is reduced in human-to-human relationships.   
It has been noted in experiments involving the tragedy of the commons 
that resource users are more likely to cooperate when, among other things, the 
users share a group identity.111 Sharing a group identity facilitates cooperation 
because there is a sense of connectedness with others in the group which 
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creates a path for empathy, something that leads to more trust and more concern 
about the other’s well-being with regards to the resource depletion. That 
identifying with others is an important factor in regulating harmful actions is also 
supported in Stanley Milgram’s famous obedience tests.112 Milgram found that 
subjects were less likely to follow an authority figure’s order to shock a victim 
when the victim’s pain became more obvious and personalized.113 The reason for 
this unwilingness, Bandura argues, is that  
 
The strength of self-evaluative reactions partly depends on how the 
perpetrators view the people toward whom behavior is directed. To 
perceive another as human enhances empathetic or vicarious 
responsiveness through perceived similarity. The joys and suffering of 
similar persons are more vicariously arousing than those of strangers or 
individuals who have been divested of human qualities. Personalizing the 
adverse effects experienced by others also make their suffering much 




So one way of reducing dehumanization in human to human relationships 
is through continuous and ongoing relationships, strong enough to develop 
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bonds that create kinship. Such bonds are precisely what Leopold seems to be 
noting in his famous land ethic, which sought to expand the moral community to 
the land:  
 
All ethics so far evolved rest upon a single premise: that the individual is a 
member of a community of interdependent parts . . . the land ethic simply 
enlarges the boundaries of the community to include soils, waters, plants, 
and animals, or collectively: the land.115 
 
 
Ironically, Leopold’s attempt to expand moral considerability to the land 
was partially founded in an attempt to humanize the land, for once one can 
empathize with the land one can develop a sense of obligation towards it. Indeed 
Leopold speaks in terms of endearment towards the land by asking the simple 
and poignant question: “Do we not already sing our love for and obligation to the 
land of the free and the home of the brave? Yes, but just what and whom do we 
love?” 116 To be able to love the land, to be able to share with it in joy and pain, 
requires the development of empathy and understanding. It is what, at least in 
psychological terms, it is to humanize. Yet, to humanize the land requires more 
than book learning; it requires a relationship with the land.   
Leopold recognized that traditional brick-and-mortar education was 
insufficient for creating an ethic. In an essay on Leopold and education, Callicott 
remarks that  
 
Leopold advocated more field and outdoor education and less passive 
sedentary indoor study . . . Above all, he believed that biological education 
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should be ecological, that is, it should strive to impart to students an 
understanding of the actual living relationships of plants and animals 
rather than only their pigeonholes in the abstract conceptual scheme of 
taxonomical categories. He suggested that the ability to read the land was 
every bit as important as the ability to read books and that too much of the 




Biology, with its emphasis on taxonomy, reinforces the idea that flora and 
fauna are discrete and hence made biologists “blind to ecological relations.” More 
fundamentally, biology helps to enlarge the moral community, to create empathy 
and thus instill moral considerability in the act as well as the thought. Thus one 
practical step towards humanizing the land is to simply interact with it; to 
understand the land at a nuanced level, a level that personalizes the land and its 
biotic citizens.  
If so, a serious restructuring of our society is in order; currently the typical 
person in the United States is almost totally insulated from the natural world. 
Nearly all of our interactions of the natural world come through artifacts; pieces of 
the world that have been transformed from beings with which to have 
relationships with to commodities for consumption. Indeed, even the number of 
field trips in the biological and environmental sciences is on decline.118 The 
“humanization” of the world may take place in a variety of ways, from daily walks 
to regular outings. Of course, the importance of this interaction is not lost on all 
environmental philosophers; Holmes Rolston in his discussion of “storied 
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residence,” for example, asks us to be perceptive of the local environment, to be 
aware of such nuances as what wildflowers are currently blooming or where the 
nearest active bird’s nest is.119 It is these direct encounters with nature that fortify 
the behavior associated with our moral judgments. That these direct counters are 
becoming more and more difficult to experience is a fact to be lamented. Still, a 
building of everyday encounters into our life, a continued renewal of our 
relationship with the world, keeps us from easily disengaging from our 
responsibilities to, and even attitudes concerning the environment.120 
At the same time, one of the methods for reducing dehumanization of the 
natural world is a shift in language from euphemism to consequences, from an 
anonymous framing of action to an agentic one. As discussed earlier language 
and dehumanization are closely linked, each influencing the other like a positive 
feedback loop, creating a cycle either vicious or ameliorative. While it may be 
unrealistic to always speak of the environment in ways recognizing in toto morally 
relevant characteristics, it is nonetheless an important goal to be aimed for.  
 
Regaining Responsibility 
Probably the most prominent as well as powerful disengagement 
mechanism in our current social circumstances is the obfuscation of 
consequences. The market system relies heavily on a disconnection between 
individuals as consumers and individuals as moral entities. The implications of 
our actions are forever camouflaged behind a system of complexity, anonymity 
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and deception. Consequences are only vaguely known and easily forgotten. In 
order to minimize disengagement, the entire process by which individuals create, 
exchange, and dispose of products needs to be revamped. First, there must be a 
transparent system, one in which the processes of creation, distribution, holding, 
marketing, and so on are clear to the consumer. The creation of this system may 
be accomplished through a variety of ways; eco-labeling, cradle-to-grave 
manufacturing, truth in advertising legislation, etc.  
But even a transparent system may not be enough, especially when the 
only reminder of one’s consequences is an intellectual one, separated from direct 
experiences with the injurious actions. We learn that confined animal feeding 
operations are responsible for polluting rivers and groundwater; yet, this 
knowledge is abstracted from context, learned not by drinking the fouled waters 
or seeing the incarcerated pigs or smelling the tons of feces that pile in great 
mounds. As Milgram showed, it is easier to harm others when their suffering is 
not visible and when our actions are spatially or temporally remote.121 Again, 
continual experiential knowledge is an important factor in reconnecting actions 
and consequences, pointing also to a need for a new way of creating goods, an 
amalgamation of labor rather than a division, one where, if labor is divided, each 
subfunction works with the final goal in mind and the individual is fully aware of 
the end of their labor.  
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Finally, it should be recalled that moral disengagement has important 
soothing qualities. If an environmentalist was to continually think on the 
consequences of their action they would be too emotionally overwhelmed to even 
get out of bed. Thankfully, disengagement can act as an emotional salve, 
allowing one to function in a world of wounds. Yet, one must forever be 
conscious of this distancing and be able to reengage when necessary. As 
illustrated by collective-action environmentalists, the alternative is a renouncing 
of personal responsibility, a deactivation of the self-regulating mechanisms that 
prevent one from acting in ways inconsistent with their values. The 
environmentalist must recognize a spectrum of action. It is not possible to do 
everything, but this limitation does not mean nothing can be done. The degree to 
which an environmentalist is able to act in accordance with their values depends 
on context and most likely differ from one person to the next. But it is the 
continual reassessment of one’s impact and one’s abilities that will keep moral 
disengagement in check and bridge the gap between thought and action.  
 
Conclusion 
The third obstacle that blocks the path to sustainability concerns the 
translation of moral attitudes to appropriate actions. One of the requirements to 
achieving sustainability is that individuals act in environmentally appropriate 
ways. While governmental coercion may be useful in some respects for 
regulating behavior, it cannot always be relied upon. What is needed to 
compliment external regulation is an internal regulation, i.e., the inculcation of an 
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environmental ethic compatible with the goals of the society so individuals will 
behave appropriately without needing to rely on the voice of authority. In fact, a 
well developed ethic may even be a stronger regulating force than external 
coercion because individuals like to believe that they act in morally upstanding 
ways. Thus, the development and implementation of an environmental ethic has 
been seen as an important toward creating the sustainable society. Yet, studies 
have shown that moral beliefs are not always easily translated into consistent 
behavior; individuals who see themselves as highly virtuous may still engage in 
acts they find morally condemnable. One of the reasons for this moral failure is 
the process of moral disengagement which allows individuals to reconstrue the 
nature or impact of their acts.  
For example, someone who is strongly concerned with resource 
conservation may still use disposable containers because the social and 
economic environment currently fosters disengagement. When purchased, 
consequences are obscured so that there is no reminder of what went into the 
products and or what will happen when they are disposed of (or more 
euphemistically thrown away). If there is something to be done about the 
rampant waste in a throw-away society, it is the responsibility of the politicians, 
manufactures, or disposal agencies. The allure of moral disengagement can be 
powerful enough to sway the most ardent environmentalist and needs to be 







In the previous three sections, I have examined three different but 
interrelated components necessary for developing appropriate behavior 
compatible with a sustainable society. One of the most important factors for 
creating the sustainable society is that individuals continually behave in an 
environmentally sustainable fashion. Yet, achieving optimal behavior in any 
society is difficult, and the challenge is no less with regards to sustainability. If 
one lives in an industrialized nation, every day one continually makes choices 
that can have a broad affect on environmental factors. Global warming, one of 
the most complicated environmental problems facing the world today, can be 
traced back to individual choices regarding eating habits, transportation choices, 
preferences in indoor climate control, and even leisure decisions. Likewise, there 
are a number of other environmental problems such as habitat erosion, species 
extinction, pollution, and sanitation that are no less linked to personal choices. 
Ultimately, a sustainable society requires proper decision making on the part of 
individual and a pattern of behavior consistent with an environmentally sensitive 
ethic.  
The feeling of personal influence over a given a scenario is one of the key 
factors in determining human agency; if people believe they have no power to 
produce results, they will not attempt to make things happen. One of the factors 
that has reduced a sense of personal empowerment in the environmental realm 
is a perpetuation of the belief that individual actors contribute little or nothing to 
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environmental problems or solutions. According to this view, philosophically 
defended by Callicott and others, environmental problems are such as to require 
mainly group solutions. While it is undoubtedly the case that group actions are 
required and can be a powerful force in creating change, group action does not 
obviate the importance of individual actors as cultural influencers and motivators, 
and as de facto contributors to problems are solutions. Once individual actors 
realize the importance of their actions for a given end, they will be more likely to 
engage in those actions. The first factor important to developing environmentally 
friendly behavior patterns is the enhancement of self-efficacy in terms of 
environmental problems and solutions.  
The second factor that plays a role in determining behavior is social 
pressure. Although social sanctions can be applied in a number of ways, the 
dominant approach to social sanctions involves governmental regulation. As a 
result, it is important to analyze governmental coercion and evaluate its ability to 
foster environmentally friendly behavior. Hobbes argues that human nature 
requires governmental regulation in order for people to act in pro-social ways. 
More recently, Hardin has used a similar argument in terms of protecting the 
environment from exploitation, specifically from what he calls “the tragedy of the 
commons.” Yet, contrary to Hardin’s reasoning, recent studies concerning the 
tragedy of the commons have shown that while governmental regulation may be 
useful at times, self-organization and communal social regulations of small 
communities have worked in numerous cases around the world, involving 
indigenous as well as non-indigenous people. Idiosyncratic factors to individuals 
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or groups of these communities that are important determiners in behavior are 
often ignored or even impeded when governmental regulation is used. Social 
regulations must work hand in hand with the personal beliefs, desires and goals 
of those being regulated. When new practices are forced upon unwilling actors, 
they will often choose to implement them in deficient ways that ensure their 
failure. Furthermore, environmental problems are such that they require constant 
attention to behavior and choices. Unless social forces are able to constantly 
regulate individual behavior patterns, there may be little change towards 
sustainability. Although government regulations hold a place in directing 
behavior, they must be used in tandem with an environmental ethic that 
cultivates a personal responsibility to act in sustainable ways.  
The third factor that affects behavior is one’s ability to self-regulate. While 
moral education is important in developing a system of values that facilitates 
sustainable decision making, it is not enough to ensure that individuals will act in 
a sustainable manner. According to Social Cognitive Theory, after social and 
personal standards of conduct have been adopted, self-evaluative reactions like 
self-condemnation and self-satisfaction work to make individuals act in 
accordance with their moral standards. Individuals normally refrain from activities 
that produce self-condemning consequences and pursue those that create self-
esteem and self-satisfaction.122 However, there are various means by which self-
evaluative reactions can be disassociated from transgressive behavior, known as 
moral disengagement. Individuals who find themselves in situations conducive to 
moral disengagement will be less motivated to refrain from activities in conflict 
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with their values. Consequently, moral disengagement has a strong influence on 
the individual’s behavior patterns.  
In order to achievable a sustainable society these three factors must be 
incorporated into social, economic, and political design. These three factors do 
not function independently of one another; each affects the development and 
enhancement of another. For example, one of the consequences of increased 
governmental regulation is a decrease in individual responsibility. This decrease 
can be seen especially well in terms of the disengagement mechanism of 
displacing responsibility. One of the most striking results that were shown by 
Milgram’s obedience studies was the amount of influence authority figures had 
over subject’s decision making. Milgram discusses this point in his results,  
 
Subjects have learned from childhood that it is a fundamental breach of 
moral conduct to hurt another person against his will. Yet, almost half the 
subjects abandon this tenet in following the instructions of an authority 
who has no special powers to enforce his commands . . . It is clear from 
the remarks and behavior of many participants that in punishing the victim 
they were often acting against their own values. Subjects often expressed 
disapproval of shocking a man in the face of his objections, and others 
denounced it as stupid and senseless. Yet many followed the 
experimental commands.123  
 
 
When individuals give up their moral responsibility to an authority, they are 
more likely to allow themselves to be participants in conduct they would 
otherwise find harmful. This tendency to permit harm is the unfortunate side 
effect of relying heavily on governmental regulation; it reinforces the notion of a 
central authority figure and, consequently, moral disengagement through the 
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displacement of responsibility. A heavy reliance on governmental coercion can in 
some ways increase moral disengagement. Similarly, the divestment of 
responsibility from individual actions can have a profound effect on personal 
efficacy. Instead of relying on individual actions for solving environmental 
problems, individuals displace responsibility to elected officials who become the 
sole source for environmental change. Similarly, moral disengagement often 
works by separating individuals from the consequences of their actions. When 
scenarios that facilitate moral disengagement are minimized, individuals are 
more readily confronted with the consequences of their actions. This 
minimization leads to a greater sense of personal responsibility for these actions, 
and in cases of positive outcomes, to a higher degree of self-efficacy. With the 
increase in responsibility also comes a realization of moral agency. Efficacy, 
governmental regulation and disengagement strongly affect each other and 
consequently patterns of behavior.  
How one implements positive change regarding these factors is a point 
which needs to be addressed. There has already been a tremendous amount of 
work regarding the usefulness and limitations of governmental coercion, both in 
general terms and more specifically in regards to environmental problems. As a 
result, there is less need to emphasize the importance of limitations with regards 
to governmental regulation. It is a subject that can be left to those who have 
spent much time and energy in addressing it.124 Less studied is the importance of 
personal beliefs in terms of influencing environmental outcomes. The importance 
                                                           
124
 See for instance Thomas Dietz, Elinor Ostrom, and Paul C. Stern, “The Struggle to Govern the 
Commons,” Science 302 (2003): 1907-12.  
 
 86 
of self-efficacy in the political arena has been looked at, but it mostly examined in 
terms of the formal political process, i.e., voting, influencing politicians, and so 
on. Shifting some of this attention towards individual actions outside of the 
explicit political process would no doubt be helpful in creating optimal patters of 
behavior. 
Lastly, an area that has had very little attention devoted to it concerns the 
relationship between moral reasoning and conduct. A substantial body of 
evidence has demonstrated the disinhibitory power of moral disengagement, 
especially in the perpetration of large-scale inhumanities.125 There has been 
much less work focused on disengagement and relations to the natural world. 
The need for addressing possibilities for disengagement is a pressing one 
because moral standards are relatively useless if self-regulating mechanisms can 
be regularly overridden. Because optimal behavior patterns are integral to 
fashioning a sustainable society, a more sustained look into the creation and 
minimization of moral disengagement should now be seen as a high priority. 
While addressing these important factors in behavior will not solve environmental 
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